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JEDBURGH

Operations. Team GilesTEAM GILES

Jedburgh Team Giles was the seventh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of Team Giles were:

Captain Bernard M.W. Knox, AC (732) (US), code name: Kentucky.

Captain Paul Lebel (French), code name: Loire.

Sergeant Gordon H. Tack (W/T), code name: Tickie.

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Giles was dispatched on the night of 8/9 July to the Finistere area, France.

Background of Resistance in Area.

Team Giles was being dispatched to the neighborhood of the SAS team Dingason. This SAS team was in close contact with Jedburgh George, (733) the new Delege Militaire Fonction, and F Section's agent Fernand (734).

The original SAS team, accompanied by Fernand, had been sent to the field on 5 June. They made contact with resistance and by 8 June had contacted 3,500 men. On the night of 9/10 June a reinforcing SAS party together with Jedburgh team George were dispatched to this base.

On 13 June word was received from Samwest and Frederick, (736) an SAS party and Jedburgh team in the Guingamp area, that they were unable to maintain an organization in the area and were falling back on Dingason.

Large quantities of supplies had been delivered to the Dingason base and reports showed that there were 2,300 armed men in the area. Also, all the railways were out of action with the exception of one single track.

(732) War Diary Vol 11 p 555

(733) See pp 39 this Vol

(734) War Diary Vol 3 p

(736) See pp 33 this Vol

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On 14 June George reported successful progress in his area, but suggested dispatching Jedburgh teams to the Finistierre and Loire Inferieure areas to develop resistance. Fernand had reported that there were 8,000 men in the Finistierre area to be organized but they were without arms.

Purpose of Mission

The specific mission of team Giles was to organize resistance in the Finistierre area. No offensive action was to be undertaken however, unless instructed to do so by SFHQ.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a non-moon reception committee arranged by F Section, with Jedburgh George's Eureka, if he could move it to the Finistierre area. If this were impossible, they would be dropped to a bonfire reception to be arranged by George.

Equipment

The team was dispatched with the standard Jedburgh load. Also, 15 containers and 6 packages were to be dropped with them.

Scale of Air Support Likely

Future air deliveries would be sufficient to arm the groups contacted by the team. However, not more than 3,000 were to be recruited without further reference to SFHQ.

Communications

The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible.

Arrangements were made for an agreed message to be broadcast over the BBC at specified times. This would serve as a means of identification to any group the team might contact.

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Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. At the time the team was dispatched there was no SAS unit in the area. However, it was possible that at a later date such a unit might be established in the area. In this case, the team would assist in establishing the base and assisting them in any way possible. If a large SAS base were established later in this area, it might be possible that the team would be placed under its command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. Each Jedburgh team came directly under the command of SFHQ. However, it would be valuable to contact other teams working in the same area, as team George was, since they would be able to provide additional information concerning the area and help in establishing the necessary contacts for developing resistance there.

An Allied Mission. Should an Allied mission be dispatched to this area later, the team might be placed under its command.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces, the team had instructions to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer of the unit. No details of their work were to be given even to this officer, but they were to ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. As soon as possible after

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arriving in the field the team would report on the organization, strength, and arms of resistance in the Finistère area. They would also report on the possibility of controlling an area into which daylight deliveries could be made at a later date.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If enemy action in the area became too great for the team to remain and carry on its activities, they were to make arrangements to report to the SAS Dingison base, after having first informed SFHQ of their intention.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the field, so in event of being taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they would give their name, rank, and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given the team before being dispatched:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Information regarding dumps and storage areas.
3. Police and Gestapo locations.
4. Information of previous operations in the area - stores delivered, available arms, recent messages received.
5. List and description of other Allied agents operating in the area:
 - a. Rado, an RF section agent trained in parachute work and sabotage (736).
 - b. Rateau, an RF agent (737).

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Operations. Team Giles (Cont'd)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged9 July From Giles (738)

"Arms already distributed in Maquis 200. The situation at Finistere is not as informed. Brest region impossible for the moment. Send three teams for regions Morlaix, Quimper and Quimperle, repeat Quimperle. Giles is installed in the region of Chateauf. He is going to contact the chiefs at Finistere who will follow to co-ordinate airfields if possible for each team. Send a million."

10 July From SPHQ (739)

"Have received your message of the ninth. Teams Francis and Gilbert parachuted on the night of 9/10 into the regions of Quimper and Quimperle. We are holding back on sending the third team to the Morlaix area until we hear from you. With it you will get your million. Thanks a lot for rapidity of contact."

11 July From SPHQ to Giles (740)

"The teams for Quimper and Quimperle have already left. We are sending, beginning to-morrow, a first team Wilary for the area of Coadri, destined for the region east of Morlaix. The code will be Peche. A second team is Horace. If the latter cannot work just now in the Brest region, it will begin its activities to the north of your zone in order to prepare its installation in the zone west of Morlaix. Signal Eureka or by bonfire. Alain will be on the reception committee."

12 July From Giles (741)

"Situation Finistere as follows. Coast regions including Brest impossible. Only way is to work out from center. Reception ready from Wednesday on. Send BBC message. Crack signals will only be sent if we wish to scrub."

12 July From Giles (742)

"Have not found packages 26 containing radio and tackle equipment. Drop replacement on Poire. Just learned of arrival of other teams. Second message is from team dropped at Coadri. Their radio broken. Send arms to Framboise and Pomme reception arranged."

14 July From Giles (743)

"Our receiver lost in forced move. Essential send ground Poire."

(738) C-4863/1 9 Jul 44
(740) C-4310 11 Jul 44
(742) C-4945/5 12 Jul 44

(739) C-3815 10 Jul 44
(741) C-4942/4 12 Jul 44
(743) C-35/7 14 Jul 44

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"On no account use ground La Lune Brille sur le Dolmen. Ground searched by Boche and messages too well known."

15 July From Giles (745)

"Received 2 loads on Pache yesterday. Boche arrived just too late. Do not use Pache again until further notice."

16 July From Giles (746)

"General report. Our region Chateaulin Chateaneuf. Maquis affiliated to FTP. We are in process of arming and organizing them in companies with orders to remain quiet. So far orders obeyed completely. Men excellent. Have had contact with Department Chief of Liberation but his organization has such incredibly bad security that we do not like to touch it. In any case it does not count for much in this area."

17 July From Giles (747)

"Have with us Canadian airman shot down over Brest a month ago, Flight Lieutenant Brown. Send instructions on escape route immediately. You dropped 6 containers on Fremboise. All found - ground safe. Drop some more. No drop on Cerise last night."

18 July From Giles (748)

"Frederick encircled but escaped. Radio lost. Tackles package found. Chute did not open. Send entire package quickly. Set smashed to hell."

19 July From Giles (749)

"Cerise ready but do not repeat until asked. Received 45 containers, 2 Jed teams and 3 French officers. Sending 1 Jed to Maquis Plou Rach Fremboise to work on Morlaix. Other to Maquis St Begel Ponne to work on Brest. Repeat broadcast of 17th on new groups. We destroy old ones at once. Too near Jerry to file them. Our losses 17, Boche 23."

22 July From Giles (750)

"Have been informed that Berthaud, Chief PFI Department, has complained to London of our activities. We think he complains that we have based our action on FTP in our zone. True enough because in our region resistance is mostly maquis FTP. We are in same Maquis as Department Chief FTP who is in liaison with Berthaud. This arrangement was made at an interview between us and Berthaud. Discussed situation yesterday with Ogden Smith and they agree with us. Expect this evening meeting with Berthaud to settle."

(744) C-69/9 15 Jul 44
 (746) C-115/13 15 Jul 44
 (748) No number 18 Jul 44
 (750) C-279/22 22 Jul 44

(745) C-72/10 15 Jul 44
 (747) C-157 17 Jul 44
 (749) C-232/19 19 Jul 44

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"Firstly we confirm that Jedburghes should organize parachute drops in agreements with FFI Departmental. Second we approve of the work of Giles with FTP who are integral part of the FFI. Third we count on the comprehension and patriotism of more of them for action and full agreement. We are happy to have made contact with Berthaud with whose fine activity we are acquainted."

24 July From Giles (752)

"Have moved for fourth time. Jerry getting on our tail."

24 July From Giles (752)

"Following objectives for bombardment have been visited. Agent of ours says information is reliable. Map references all on France over 60,000 published by War Office 1943. 1st headquarters north coast defenses, Chateau des isles in part 2 kms north of Les Neven west of road Les Neven - Plouneour Trez reference sheet 2 map 2 Landerneau square 0820. Second battalion with all its transport along both sides of road in wood in curve of road Landerneau - Les Neven, 1 km northwest of Landerneau, reference sheet 2, Landerneau square 1205. Third parachutist cantonment in wood east of road Chateaulin - Quimerch, 6 kms due north of Chateaulin in reference sheet 3 Gee 5 Chateaulin square 2481."

25 July From Giles (754)

"Saw Berthaud today. Everything fine."

25 July From Giles (755)

"Received and distributed 4 loads. Money and radio received and Francis got his last night. Have 1 radio complete, 1/2 million and 2 carbines for Gilbert. Team Horace sent into Brest area by arrangement with Berthaud. No idea whereabouts Hilary. Send more boots they are essential for Maquis. Some of our company march in sabots. Have set up medical service for evacuation of wounded to Quimper by 2 Quimper doctors. Please send some USA cigarettes for Giles. We are rolling our own."

26 July From Giles (756)

"In grave danger. Missed broadcast last night. May miss tonight's. Boche concentrating all round us."

26 July From SFHQ to Giles (757)

"Our congratulations medical organization. Are pleased your understanding with Berthaud."

(751) C-5980 22 Jul 44

(753) C-401/29 24 Jul 44

(755) C-427/31 25 Jul 44

(757) C-6006 26 Jul 44

(752) C-378/28 24 Jul 44

(754) C-406/30 25 Jul 44

(756) C-482/34 26 Jul 44

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"Received message for Gilbert. Why send it to us, he has a receiver. Still have Gilbert's radio. Liaison out owing to following events. Boche began concentrating in Chateaufort area beginning this week. 5 SWP were captured and FTP maquis became almost uncontrollable. In order to avoid worse trouble we were forced to allow one section to attempt rescue by ambush. Without our knowledge other maquis did the same thing. Only result so far has been skirmish on route Quimper-Chateaufort. Two dead on either side. This was provoked by a group acting independently of us. Our position here very dangerous. In general FTP are getting very hard to control and we may not be able to do it much longer. Berthaud informed us message for Bretagne has been changed. Is so please tell us new one. Repeat that FTP are reaching boiling point and explosion may occur if Boche continues to hunt them."

28 July From Giles (759)

"Trying hard to get Gilbert's set to him, but liaison extremely difficult in this area."

28 July From Giles (760)

"Our situation in center becoming difficult. Even without our taking offensive action the Boche knows what is happening in the area. We have information that he is preparing large scale action against the maquis of the center. His information comes from the Feld-gendarmerie who are stationed here at Chateaufort and Chateaulin. Since our arrival with the total cessation of offensive action the Feld-gendarmerie has had leisure to patrol and get precise information. If they bring large forces into the area against us open war will break out in the center. The only way out we can see is to carry out widely dispersed small scale actions against the Feld-gendarmerie so as to prevent them circulating in the countryside. If they cannot get precise information, they cannot mount important operations against us. Please think it over and give a decision fast. We are convinced that if the Feld-gendarmerie is allowed to work unhampered for a little while longer, Jerry will start combing out the maquis in the center. In that case we repeat open war will break out. If we can keep the Feld-gendarmerie on the hop, they will never know where to strike."

28 July From Giles (761)

"FTP companies well adapted to small operations but lack training for manoeuvre and attack. One of French officers dropped on Cerise whom we sent to an FTP company as instructor has assumed command of the company at their request. He is doing wonders with them. This seems to be the answer to the problem of making real military units out of maquis. Send us more young officers for maquis of central Finistere. They will also help us keep the boys down until D-day. Situation calm again here for the moment."

(758) C-520/35 27 Jul 44
(760) C-553/39 28 Jul 44

(759) C-544/26 28 Jul 44
(761) C-564/37 28 Jul 44

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28 July From Giles (76?)

Target for today. Chateau Gai in woods immediately south of river Aulne 3 1/2 kms due south of Chateaufneuf. Chateau is 2 kms southwest of St Gouazez and 3 kms south of Laz. There is a small lake in front of Chateau. Chateau is rest home for Brest submarine crews and also observation point for local repression troops. All the terrain south of Laz is denied to us because it is under observation from Chateau. Urgent for us since this terrain is our last way of retreat. Please give it the works.

29 July From SFHQ to Giles (762)

Do not hesitate to move when in danger. You must avoid in any circumstances to enter into action until operations start. Message for D-day unchanged.

28 July From Giles (764)

*Inter-departmental chiefs FTP whom we saw 10 days ago suggested dropping Jed teams in Ile et Villaine. They can hide Ile et Villaine. The Gestapos in Brittany. They have sent us three drop grounds with message and safe assurance that reception committee will be waiting. If you don't send Jeds, you can always send arms."

29 July From Giles (765)

"Sadly disappointed at your answer to our 35. You did not answer our question at all. We are not thinking of our own skins but of success of operation. We repeat in words of one syllable, if Boche attacks maquis in this area, no power on earth can stop a general explosion. They can only attack if they have precise information. They can only get precise information through Feld-gendarmerie. It may be already too late. Information this morning Boche about to install 25 companies between Callac and Chateauneuf. At least 500 at Chateauneuf. Our liaison is being completely cut by action of Feld-gendarmerie. Messengers are arrested, tortured and shot every day. In these circumstances our work is becoming almost impossible. Central Finistere a powder magazine which needs only a spark and the Boche is going to provide the spark. As for moving when we are in danger, we have moved five times since our arrival. But 15 armed companies in the center. Cannot keep moving all the time. We have managed to keep maquis quiet until now but if they are attacked, nothing can stop open fighting in Finistere."

29 July From SFHQ to Giles (766)

"Cannot say when your targets will be bombed though they are on the list. Two Jed teams just arrived in Lille at Villaine."

(762) C-581/40 28 Jul 44
(764) C-588/38 28 Jul 44
(766) C-4354 29 Jul 44

(763) C-6031 28 Jul 44
(765) C-622/43 29 Jul 44

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"Our information on Boche espionage in center confirmed today by Berthaud. He estimates 5,000 Boche for operation. Only way we can see to avoid open warfare is to withdraw completely all armed companies from area Chateaufort Chateaulin. Withdrawal must be fast. We propose to hide 7 companies in region east of line Scaer-Roudouallec-Spezet. Companies of north to stay in place since they are almost at frontier of Cotes du Nord. If Boche comes after us there, we will either retire into Morbihan and Cote du Nord or fight. For latter eventuality please be ready to drop us loads. If necessary in daylight."

30 July From Giles (768)

"Thanks for chateau. First reports say half demolished. Many Boche hit. Big party night before in chateau. Possible important officers were hit. Couldn't have been better."

30 July From SFHQ to Giles (769)

"We quite agree about action by small groups against field gendarmerie. Only mistake in interpretation made you interrupt all operations. Must keep enemy in danger everywhere ceaselessly by guerilla action, that is to say, generalized mobile offensive action by surprise and refusing large scale battle."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (770)

"Allied forces advancing into Brittany. Most important maintain present harassing activity but prevent general flare-up until you get order."

2 August From Giles (771)

"Chateaufort area almost completely destroyed. Boche has evacuated it. Number of casualties closely guarded secret but sure it is high."

2 August From Giles (772)

"Message from Francis. Major Ogden Smith killed. Radio wounded. Le Zachmeur safe. Because of papers Ogden Smith was carrying, do not drop on any of Francis grounds until you hear from him. He asks for 2 planes with equipment for ground Brochet."

2 August From Giles (773)

"Situation - our Hq Plessis 2 kms southeast of Laz. Intend to stay here unless they send 3 regiments. Are in position to protect dump ground Ananas from which we

(767) C-652/46 30 Jul 44

(769) C-8053 30 Jul 44

(771) C-812/56 2 Aug 44

(773) C-837/58 2 Aug 44

(768) C-663/47 30 Jul 44

(770) C-4491 2 Aug 44

(772) C-821/59 2 Aug 44

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will send arms to Gilbert for coast. Have 3 companies in immediate area. Limits of our zone of action. First, south limit by arrangement with Gilbert - line Douarnenez Brieo Gourin. North line Daoulas Sizun Berrien. East line Carhaix and department limit. We have companies north of our north line but liaison with them is difficult. Boche concentration against us now seems unlikely. One of our groups yesterday made reconnaissance of remains of Chateautrey area. We were fired on by Boche and killed 17 of them without loss."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (774)

"Desire send you Jedburgh team from Thursday 3rd August. You should arrange all necessary FFI contacts. Give us urgently ground on which you can receive team."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (775)

"BBC action messages passed tonight. Urgent you remember these are signal for concentrated guerilla activity but not for open warfare. Above passed to all Jedburghs in Brittany and SAS."

2 August From Giles (776)

"Received message Napoleon. No contact with Colonel Heonsult. Lack arms and ammo. Going over to offensive tonight."

3 August From Giles (777)

"Germans moving in large numbers Chateaulin, Chateauxneuf, Carhaix on foot, cycle and horse cart. Send aircraft."

3 August From Giles (778)

"4 loads received on Poire. Only one on Ananas. Please repeat Ananas tonight with 4 aircraft at least. Please send package for Giles. Information that parachutist division from Chateaulin and Sizun is leaving Finistere."

3 August From Giles (779)

"Armande drop successful. 1 company armed region Guerlesquin. Detailed report on Scrignac incidents 4 Germans dead and probably 16 wounded."

3 August From Giles (780)

"Boche move to east held up in Morbihan. Columns stuck on and near road Chateaulin, Chateauxneuf, Carhaix. Send aviation. They can't miss."

(774) C-6101 2 Aug 44

(776) C-874/61 2 Aug 44

(778) C-894/62 3 Aug 44

(780) C-916/67 3 Aug 44

(775) C-6106 2 Aug 44

(777) C-884/61 3 Aug 44

(779) C-896/63 3 Aug 44

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"Information from prisoner captured today. Second parachutist division on move from Douarnenez to Brittany front. Yesterday were 2 kms west of Chateaulin. Today at 6 p.m. they were 3 kms from Chateaufort. Moving in carts and on foot. Prisoner says their morale is good.

3 August From SFHQ to Giles (782)

"This was General Koenig's message to all resistance groups giving information on procedure when overrun by Allied troops."

4 August From Giles (783)

"We have cut the road between Chateaufort and Carhaix by blowing bridge where road crosses Aroze near Landeleau. Ambushes and guerilla attacks on all side roads. Please bombard troops on road tomorrow."

4 August From SFHQ to Giles (784)

"Essential that advancing Allied troops have military intelligence. Therefore arrange for maximum thirty your men who know district well to move towards Allied front line by various routes covering as large area as possible. They should bring with them information on enemy dispositions. Most important items are first, preparation of fortified lines of defense; second, troop concentrations with identification if possible; third, targets likely to be fairly permanent; fourth, artillery emplacements; fifth, tank harbors; sixth, defended points; seventh, machine gun emplacements; eighth, petrol dumps; ninth, ammunition dumps; tenth, enemy headquarters. They will be enlisted on arrival and will act as guides to forward units. They should ask for the nearest division G-2 of the first soldier they meet. On arrival at divisional headquarters they must ask for G-2 branch. No password must be mentioned until divisional headquarters specifically ask for it. When asked for they will give Angouleme as password."

4 August From SFHQ to Giles (785)

"Top speed of Allied advance necessitates immediate orders for maximum activity by resistance. Important you continue notify us all enemy concentrations for bombing attack. Give enemy no respite where possible for you to attack them. Put into immediate operation plan for guides with Angouleme password as already given you."

5 August From SFHQ to Giles (786)

"After passage allied armor resistance be prepared mop up remaining enemy elements and provide organized

(781) C-933/69 3 Aug 44
(783) C-956/70 4 Aug 44
(785) C-207 4 Aug 44

(782) C-143 3 Aug 44
(784) C-175, C-176, C-177 4 Aug 44
(786) C-243 5 Aug 44

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protection for Allied lines of supply and communication. First priority present missions. You will be informed of lines to be protected at appropriate time."

5 August From Giles (787)

"Received your messages. Orders of General Koenig sent to all companies. Guides for advancing Allied forces already en route. You can drop Jed team on Poire. We have not received message stating their mission. Situation Finistere - Boche evacuating. 2nd parachutist division now out of Finistere. According to prisoners taken yesterday it is heading for Nantes. We have attacked it all along its route. Liaison extremely difficult for us now but will do our best to get orders to all concerned. What instructions for Jeds when overrun."

5 August From Giles (788)

"Elements of German forces proceeding east along road Chateaulin, Chateauneuf, Carhaix. Have turned back and are heading west. We are attacking them all along the road. Just learned that important elements of 2nd parachutist division are quartered in villages of Reunchompune and Poulargarront. Both villages one and a half kms northwest of Chateaulin."

5 August From SFHQ to Giles (789)

"Bridge destruction road Chateauneuf, Carhaix noted. Presume this was before General Koenig's orders reached you. Remember preservation of permanent works now priority task. Specific target for preservation is repeater station at Carhaix."

6 August From Giles (790)

"Bridge Landeleau destroyed before receipt Koenig's orders. No orders received on demolition in any case. Will do our best for Carhaix but you might have mentioned it before. Contact yesterday with US advanced column which reached Chateauneuf. Believe it has retired to Gourin. Boche has blown bridge over Aulne on road Chateauneuf Scaerr. We will attempt to stop him blowing bridge Pont du Stanc. We asked Berthaud 5 days ago for plan of demolition prevention but without result. Our information on Carhaix. 2000 Boche there. Town strongly fortified. 400 armed FFI for outside town. You asked us to preserve repeater station. Presume you mean railway station. 2nd Boche parachutist division in small detachments all over our area using guerilla tactics. Our liaison is extremely difficult."

(787) C-1063/73 5 Aug

(789) C-282 5 Aug 44

(788) C-1060/74 5 Aug 44

(790) C-416 6 Aug 44

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"Carhaix - cannot promise much because of our situation. We are in middle of Boche parachutist division which has taken to the countryside. Liaison between our companies can only be maintained by heavily armed motorized groups which have frequent casualties. We have no real contact with FFI of Carhaix. They were armed by Francis. We could muster men to go to Carhaix but not all of them would get there and the result could easily be complete disaster. If you wish us at all cost to send our men there we will try but they will have to go on foot as we are almost out of petrol. Give instruction."

6 August From SFHQ to Giles (792)

"Resistance headquarters Brittany under command Mission Aloes. Mission parachuted in Cotes du Nord night 4/5 August to Frederick. They ask for contact with FFI Finistere. Send post box urgently. Jedburgh Ronald parachuted same night to Gilbert with mission to liaise with FFI to whom he will transmit Aloes orders. Ronald has contact with London and with Aloes. Confirm if you have received our message indicating action you should take when overrun."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (793)

"Resistance are requested by army command to do everything possible to protect following roads after cavalry and motorized divisions have passed well in advance other elements. First, route Rostronen - Carhaix - Brest; second, Pontivy - Gourin - Carhaix - Chateaulin - Brest. Protection should be carried out only by organized units."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (794)

"We did mean repeater and not railway station. Repeater station is part of telephone system."

8 August From Giles (795)

"New Hn Chateaufort area. Do not strafe. Contact yesterday with US Forward unit at Rostronen. Daily liaison from now on. Situation Finistere - plenty of Boche left, mostly parachutists here. Will not surrender. Yesterday had prisoners third parachutist division from Huelgoat. We need more arms for job."

9 August From Giles (796)

"Visited Aloes yesterday. Do not understand mission of Jedburgh Ronald. We have undertaken to hold open road Carhaix, Chateaufort, Chateaulin, Daoulas. Will try to find organization at Huelgoat. Have had no contact with Berthault since Napoleon had message except constant

(791) C-1117/76 6 Aug 44

(792) C-509 7 Aug 44

(795) C-1251/78 8 Aug 44

(792) C-5149 6 Aug 44

(794) C-510 7 Aug 44

(796) C-1291/79 9 Aug 44

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demand for reinforcements for Quimper. We sent what we could but it wasn't much. News of fighting around Quimper is hard to get but there seems to have been a mistake made down there. Cannot see strategic importance of Quimper for moment."

9 August From SFHQ to Giles (797)

"Main function of Jedburgh Ronald is to provide direct communications line with Aloes and transmit Aloes orders to resistance groups."

10 August From Giles (798)

"Chateauneuf, Sizun, Brassparts, Pleyben, Coray in hands of FFI."

10 August From Giles (799)

"Are surrounded by several superior officers named by FTP. What importance are we to attach to these Lt Colonels Up till now we have worked with them as equals though they rather look down on us. What attitude should we take toward them. Average age of FTP colonel is between 23 and 33. They are not exactly brilliant in the military line but are good talkers. They seem to be worrying mainly about their share of the gravy."

11 August From Giles (800)

"Chateaulin in hands of FFI."

11 August From Giles (801)

"Still don't know what a repeater station is but it hasn't been blown up. Carhaix in hands of FFI."

11 August From Giles (802)

"Consider our mission here finished. Center region free of Boche and Aloes is going to take charge of troops. Aloes is going to set up house just near us tomorrow. Please send instructions."

11 August From SFHQ to Giles (803)

"Here are instructions for you when overrun by Allies. As Allies have given military status to FFI you can accept a command from FFI if such proposed. Meantime continue mopping up operations guarding roads to enable military to advance etc. As soon as your mission is finished, report to us. Will then arrange with Aloes for your return here."

(797) C-672 9 Aug 44
(799) C-1378 10 Aug 44
(801) C-1441/85 11 Aug 44
(803) C-911 11 Aug 44

(798) C-1392/83 10 Aug 44
(800) C-1440/84 11 Aug 44
(802) C-1467/86 11 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)11 August From SFHQ to Giles (804)

"Congratulations for protecting repeater station. For your information it is part of central telephone exchange."

12 August From SFHQ to Giles (805)

"Have forwarded text your message to Aloes. If he has no further need of you will arrange for your immediate return here. Awaiting Aloes decision."

13 August From Giles (806)

"Presquille de Crozon occupied by 12,000 organized Boche armed with mortars and artillery. They recaptured Otneault this morning and have attempted to retake Chateaulin. Please strafe them. We are trying to get American armor from Morlaix but don't think we have much hope. What about sending us some paratroops."

14 August From Giles (807)

"Boche sending out patrols from Crozon. Have contacted Americans at Morlaix and they do not have enough force to help us. We shall need more arms. Send them daylight. Our headquarters now in Chateauneuf."

14 August From SFHQ to Giles (808)

"Regret all air operations to Brittany from here finished. Consult Aloes for requirements. He has contact 3rd Army for urgent supplies."

4 September From SFHQ to Giles (809)

"Mounting sea operation to Benodet south of Quimper at midday on Wednesday 6th September. You should return on this operation complete with all equipment. Contact Aloes for instructions."

Report on Team Upon Return from Field - 8 July - 9 September 1944

Preliminaries. The team was alerted and briefed by Major Horton on 16 June. Its mission was to organize and arm the resistance in Finistere. General Koenig saw the team before it left, and emphasized the importance of sending back information, since very little was known about the FFI of Finistere. Just before the team actually left, Captain Lebel was called to London, and asked to agree on a BBC message which would be

(804) C-938 11 Aug 44
 (806) C-1633/87 13 Aug 44
 (808) C-6222 14 Aug 44

(805) C-1015 12 Aug 44
 (807) C-1687/88 14 Aug 44
 (809) C-4824 4 Sept 44

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the signal for the large-scale attack on the Boche in Brittany. He suggested Le Chapeau De Napoleon Est-il Toujours A Perros-Guirec and this suggestion was adopted. After one abortive trip over the DZ on 4 July, team Giles finally got away from Harrington in a B-24 at 1100 hours 8 July.

The Drop, 8/9 July. The jumping order was Knox, Tack, Lebel. The pilot reported seeing the lights about 0100 hours and the hole was opened. For the next twenty minutes we circled round trying to find the lights again but since we had agreed with the pilot that he would drop us blind if necessary, we were not too worried as we were going to get out anyway. Finally he saw the lights, and dropped us in as good a run-in as I have ever seen. Knox and Tack landed fairly close together - Captain Lebel joined us after two or three minutes. We were welcomed immediately by a group of very excited, very young Frenchmen, all of whom we had to kiss in turn.

We were finally greeted by the organizer of the reception committee, M. Arzel, who is now adjoint to the Prefet of Quimper. Arzel explained to us that the FFI in Finistere were rather disorganized as a result of the capture and execution of twelve of their leaders during the previous week. Among those executed, was Poussin, one of the men we were to contact. He proposed to send us to a maquis somewhere outside Chateauneuf-Du-Faou, the chief of which was a very capable man.

The Reception Committee. Meanwhile the reception committee had been gathering up the containers, and packages, and we were just preparing to break out our rucksacks and move off in true Jedburgh style, groaning under the weight of pack,

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weapons, and wireless set, when we noticed three cars and a large truck. This Maquis, it seemed, was motorized. They loaded the containers on to the truck, chutes and all, and about 0430 hours in the morning the convoy moved off, German rifles sticking out of all the windows, in the direction of Chateauneuf. We kept to the back roads, but the three of us were not a little worried, especially by the truck, which made as much noise as a Sherman tank. At one point we moved through the town of Briec, and halted for fifteen minutes in the main street while one car went back to look for some stragglers. The last part of the journey was done in broad daylight.

The Maquis, when we finally reached it, turned out to be a group of approximately fifty men, living in a small wood about 3 kilometers west of the village of Léz. Their chief was away in Cotes-Du-Nord, trying to get arms, and the 2-IC, a peasant named Lebras, who had been a regular soldier, was in charge.

First Days in the Maquis, 9-12 July. This Maquis was fairly well organized, and the distribution of arms went off fast and smartly. Captain Lebel and Knox organized a defense system round the CP and spent the rest of the day inspecting the position and instructing the men in the use of their new arms. Lebras sent a Liaison man into Chateauneuf to call out 50 more men to complete the company.

We were very happy and very busy, but we were not in contact with men who could provide us with dropping zones and reception committees on the scale which we knew necessary. But there was nothing to do but wait until the leader returned

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from Cotes Du Nord.

That afternoon we listened to the BBC messages, and heard the original message that had signalled our arrival - "La Lune Brille sur le Dolmen." We were rather worried at the prospect of going back to the same dropping zone, but decided to risk it. How we got away with this second reception I shall never know. It was a much heavier load this time, the men were exhausted, we were still loading containers on the truck in broad daylight. We finally got away, and safely back to the CP.

We found out later that morning that 300 German paratroops had arrived in Laz five minutes after we had gone through and that they were searching all the farms in the area. We sent this information off to London by Pigeon, since we were afraid that the paratroops might have a DF car with them. The pigeons had been parachuted all over the area the night before. This message apparently never reached its destination.

The paratroops didn't find us, and during the course of the day we armed another Maquis which was based on the woods around Plessis, to the east of Laz.

First Contact. Yves Legal, the leader of this Maquis finally returned on 11 July. He turned out to be FTP military leader for the center of the department. He had under his orders Maquis and potential Maquis all over the department. We explained our mission to him and asked him for drop-grounds and reception committees in every possible direction. We settled at once two grounds for two Jedburgh teams, one for Brest and the other for Morlaix. These two grounds Pomme and Framboise were used later for drops of arms.

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We took the decision, since we had made this very useful contact, to stay in the center of Finistere and make out of it a strongly armed base from which the arming of the coast areas could be carried on. We communicated this plan to London.

Pêche. Meanwhile we learned that two Jedburgh teams for South Finistere had been dropped on the night of the 9-10 July. We did not know that one of them had dropped near Coadri, where we had arranged our first arms drop. This was ground Pêche. By the time our drop was made, 14 July, the ground was blown, and the reception committee was attacked by the Boche the next day. The German casualties were out of all proportion to ours and to the amount of material which they took. As a result, they did not send any punitive troops into this area, the Scaer region, again.

Drop Grounds. Meanwhile the machinery had been started by Legal, and the heads of the different Maquis of Finistere started to come in to our HQ. They would give us the co-ordinates of a drop-ground, we would instruct them in the procedure of our reception committee, and make them repeat it to us to be sure they understood. We would give them a BBC message, and send them on their way. Since there were obviously going to be so many drops, in so many places, we had to trust to the leaders to run the receptions by themselves. Without exception, they did well. Of all the drops organized by Giles, with the one exception of Pêche, there was not one which left any material in the hands of the Germans.

So many men came in that we got to repeating our lecture on reception committees in our sleep. During this period we organized, and sent off to London, the following grounds,

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Poire, Cerise, Framboise, Orange, Abricot, Raisin, Amande.
All of them were served.

Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud. On 12 July we were visited by the FFI chief of Finistere, commandant - now Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud. He was Fouassin's successor, and had his HQ at Quimper. We explained our plans to him, agreed to keep in liaison with him through Legal, and parted in friendly fashion. After his second visit, we had to shoot one of the men in his car, who was a known Gestapo agent. Berthaud had given him a lift in his car, and he had followed Berthaud into our CP. We decided, in view of this, and several other indiscreet actions of Berthaud's, to have as indirect a liaison as possible with him.

First Move. On 13 July we were visited by the Maire of Laz who told us that large German forces were in the area looking for us, and that the map their commanding officer was using had red marks against the name of the farm where we were taking our meals. So that night we moved. The company (now 100 men) marched across country to the farm Learen and the next night to Kernour, a very high plateau in the vicinity of St Thors, which dominated the country for miles around. In this place we managed to stay until 20 July.

In the course of the move we lost our receiver, but recovered it next day. We sent one message blind, and were glad to see it in our file when we returned.

Visit by FTP Commanders of Brittany. While we were at Kernour, about 15 July, two FTP departmental chiefs came to see us. One of them was a young man of 24, Chevalier. He is now a Lieutenant Colonel, right hand man to Berthaud in

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Quimper. They gave us some very interesting facts about the history of resistance in Brittany, and we were finally able to win them over to our policy, which was, as ordered, to arm, organize, and wait for the message. They were naturally inclined to begin using the arms at once, but after several long discussions with us, they finally announced gravely that they were in agreement with the plans of the Allied High Command.

They also promised to send us dropping zones in Ile el Vilarve which they said was the weakest department in Brittany. These grounds were sent to London, and I think, were served.

Cerise. One evening as we listened to the BBC and checked off our messages we heard Fifi A Une Bouche En Cerise - a message which we had been expecting for a long time. But it continued - Fifi Recevra La Visite De Neuf A-la Ce Soir. So one of us had to go there, and in a car, since it was much too far to walk. Captain Label went in the end, and received Jed teams Horace (810) and Hilary (811) as well as three French parachutist officers - Equation, Egalite, Equivalence. So our problem now as to get the Jed teams off to their areas

Brest and Morlaix respectively. The next day, I was to go over to Cerise with a convoy and pick up Horace, then take them up to Lennedern, the nearest Maquis we had to the Brest area. But that evening one of the suspected miliciens whom we were questioning escaped, and we had to move that night. We crossed the canal, and set up in a valley about 3 kilometers from Lannon. That night I went over to Cerise (it was near Peniti) and brought team Horace over to our HQ since our arrangements for transport to Lennedern had broken down. Captain Label got them away the next night, after almost

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(811) See p this Vol

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running into a paratroop patrol on the Chateaulin-Chateauxneuf road. That same day, Hilary had started for the North. So now all five teams were working in Finistere.

Flight-Lieutenant Brown. We were joined about this time by a Canadian pilot who had been shot down over Brest, and was wandering through Brittany. Since the escape route had broken down since 6 June, we kept him with us, and he was a great help to us - he worked with Sergeant Tack on the ciphering of messages. When we sent him off to the American troops on 6 August, we were very sorry to see him go.

Medical Service. While at Lennon we finally organized the medical service which was to save so many lives during the operations to come. Doctor Belin of Brie, who had already evacuated one of our wounded from Kernouk, set up a hospital at his home in Brie, and Doctor Ollivier Henri, a surgeon of Quimper, placed himself at our disposal for operations. These two men were to save many French lives in the period between 4-12 August - and one American soldier, who was left for dead by the Germans outside Chateauxneuf, was cared for by Doctor Belin, and operated on by Doctor Henri. He was eventually returned to the US Army in a convalescent state. These two men worked for over a month in an area which was always thick with German troops.

Meeting with Francis. While at Lennon we made contact with Captain Lazachmeur and Major Ogden-Smith who came to see us. There was some confusion about zones of action, which we cleared up on the spot. We had a full discussion on the policy to pursue and came to complete agreement on all points. This was the last time I ever saw Colin.

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More Grounds. During the whole of this period we were organizing arms drops on an ever increasing scale. How we managed to get them all over without German interference I shall never understand. It may be that there were so many widely dispersed that the Boche never managed to catch up with them. Most of our grounds were thoroughly searched by the Boche one or two days after the drop.

Information Service. From Lennon we sent out a number of volunteers, all of them technical men, either army or curliaw, to gather military information on specific areas. One group was sent off to look for a possible landing place on the north coast, and one to pick up likely targets for air. This latter group brought back some extremely good targets which we sent off to London. One of them was a German CP for the north coast defences which I understood was later dealt with by the RAF.

Another Move. We were informed of increasing German activity in our immediate area - in particular, German patrol in Lennon, two miles away. The Feldgendarmarie had installed itself in force in Chateauneuf-du-Faou. All our information from Chateauneuf spoke of German preoccupation with our activities. So we decided to move again, this time to the north, across the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road. The move was carried out at night, and as a result of the breakdown of a peasant cart in a narrow road, Sergeant Tack, Flight Lieutenant Brown and Captain Knox had to carry the radio equipment. We arrived at our new destination - the farms of Dint, Prenhout and Langolen, at about 0400 hours.

Hunted. That morning we learned that German paratroops

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had arrived at Lennon, and were searching the whole area. We put outposts in position to observe the Pletben-Chateauf road, where the first signs of German concentration against our new position would be visible. That afternoon we learned that five men from our Maquis who were passing near Lennon on a mission to get food, had been captured by the Feld-gardarmarie. One of them was a radio operator, who had been working with Sergeant Tack.

Obviously we had to move again, but the country north of us was very unfavorable. There was only one place to go - back across the canal to Kernoux. Unfortunately, Legal was away organizing the distribution of arms which had been dropped on Poire, so we had to organize the move ourselves. We started at nightfall, and as we moved south to the Chateauf-Pleyben road, we saw German signal flares ahead of us. They were answered by others in the Chateauf direction, and others were seen in the direction of Pletben. Lebras, who was in command of the company, took a section ahead to investigate, and did not return. We did not see him until two days later. So we were left with two-thirds of a company which was absolutely without cadres, and which was exhausted by the march of the night before. We led them a considerable distance west across country and then cut across the Pleyben Chateauf road. As we crossed we saw many more flares ahead of us; the Boche seemed to be holding the whole line of the canal. Our immediate problem was to get through Lennon, since we had arrived in a road which went right through the town. There was no question of going across country any more. The men were already tired out, it was late, and we had many more miles to cover.

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Lennon. As we approached the town, we sent a small party ahead to reconnoitre. They went ahead and five minutes later we caught up with them; they were afraid to go any farther. We realized that we were going to have to lead them ourselves. They were too frightened and leader less to be of any use to us that night. So the reconnaissance of Lennon was made by Captain Lebel, Captain Knox and Sergeant Tack, with the Jed set on our backs. Luckily there were no Germans there, we found out next morning they had left an hour or so before. As we moved out of the town we heard trucks moving on the Pleyben road to our north.

The Canal. The same formula was followed at the canal. We had chosen to cross at Pont Ty-Men, simply because it was the nearest bridge. Jedburgh Giles had to cross it first, and then the others came across. There were no troops guarding it, God knows why. They were guarding the lock, 1000 yards down stream, where we had originally intended to cross. Just after we crossed the bridge we heard machine gun and rifle fire behind us. We made a forced march for two miles and then sat down to rest.

Night March to Kernour. It was now about 0230 hours and we still had a long way to go. We decided to make a forced march all the way there. The men dropped off behind us one by one, and when we arrived, about 0700 hours there were only 8 of us left. The others had been unable to stand the pace, and had hidden in barns along the road. This incident shows the defects of these troops. They had no physical stamina, and once separated from their real leaders, they disintegrated. To balance these defects, they had remarkable qualities, which they were to show magnificently a few weeks later.

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Ambush on the Quimper Road. We were awakened that same morning by the bursting of grenades and machine-gun fire. A battle was taking place on the Quimper road, 1500 meters away. It was one of the ambushes we had set to intercept the transport of our five prisoners to the Kommandatur at Quimper, where "investigations" usually took place. Evidently, from the sound of the battle, it had not been successful. As the survivors came back to us, they told us that one of their members had disobeyed orders, and fired on a truckload of German troops coming from Quimper. The Germans, after killing our Bren-gunner, had returned to Quimper. They would certainly come back and search the area, and as we counted our men and arms we felt very low. We had fifteen men and two Bren guns. Luckily for us the Germans searched the country to the south of us, but never quite reached our position. After shooting several farmers and burning some farms, they withdrew.

German Concentration. From this moment on, we began to get more and more information on German troop concentration in our area. This information was all confirmed by Lieutenant-Colonel Berthaud, from Quimper. By this time we had about 2000 armed men, organized in companies, living in the Maquis in Central Finistere. If the Germans did concentrate troops in the area and begin a drive, nothing could stop a general explosion. And this we were under orders to prevent.

The Chateau. Our position, and all the surrounding countryside, was dominated by the Chateau de Trevezet, which was occupied by a German garrison, who maintained an observation service from the roof. In view of the German concentration we could not overlook the possibility that we might be forced

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to move by day, and in that event we would be watched from the chateau. We therefore asked London to bombard it. On 30 July, early in the morning, it was dive-bombed by three RAF planes. We learned afterwards that the whole population of Chateaufort had run out of church to watch the proceedings. The chief of the Feldgendarmerie of Chateaufort, Alber Ehrhardt, had promised the citizens that there would be a surprise for them before Sunday. He hadn't expected this one. The whole population was jubilant. The Germans had put on a huge party the night before, and had been caught quite literally, with their pants down. The number of dead was kept a closely guarded secret, but when we occupied the chateau ten days later, there were still a lot of them under the ruins. We could smell them. On 31 July, in view of renewed German activity in the area we moved again, this time back to our old haunts, west of Laz, to the village of Plessis.

Plessis. This was to be the HQ from which we carried on the attack on the 2nd Parachutist Division. We did not leave it, until central Finistere was liberated from the Boche. Our first move was to carry out a reconnaissance in the grounds of the chateau, in the course of which seventeen Germans were killed. The Germans evacuated the ruins the next day. On 2 August we received a message from Captain Lezachmeur telling us of the death of Major Ogden-Smith. We sent a message to London cancelling all his grounds, since the Germans had found papers on his body.

Meanwhile our arms-drops continued. From Plessis we organized the drops on Groseille, Noisette, Noix, Ananas, Prune, Manderine, Fraise. Ground Ananas was almost in our backyard - we had two battalions around it, and intended to

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fight instead of moving if we were attacked. We had one drop on it on 2 August, and on the evening of 3 August, since we expected four planes, we prepared fires, for the reception. On this particular occasion, many of the local peasants had asked to be allowed to come to the "parachutage". To their surprise, and ours, the "parachutage" took the form of a strafing attack by a JU 88, armed with four cannon. We could not get the fires out in time, and the German plane was able to make two runs. Luckily, there were no casualties.

Le Chapeau de Napoleon. On 2 August we learned that the Zwerter Fallschirmjager Division was on the move from its base in the Chateaulin area eastward along the road to Carhaix. They were on foot, on bicycles and in horse-drawn carts. We were very much tempted to attack them, but this would have been contrary to our orders. But that afternoon we heard the message we had so long been waiting for - and the attack on the 2nd Paratroop Division began.

The Second Paratroop Division. We had seven companies in position along the main road, and they were immediately given orders to begin harassing attacks on the 2nd Division. In order to get instructions to the companies north of the road we had to send armed groups in cars to rush across, firing and throwing grenades, at unimportant crossroads. Most of them got across, but in one of these expeditions, the young brother of Legal was killed. The head of the division was already in Carhaix, and in order to prevent any more of them getting through we destroyed the bridge near Laneblau. This was accompanied by a large-scale ambush which forced the Germans to leave the road and strike into the countryside. After two days of attack all along the road, the division

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turned back, concentrating in villages between Pleyben and Chateaulin. Its advance guard stayed in Carhaix.

Prisoners. In the course of these attacks a considerable number of prisoners was taken. Captain Knox together with Legal interrogated them. They were all from the 2nd Paratroop Division, and all of them Hitlerites to a man. They admitted to the atrocities they had committed, refused to believe that the Americans had taken Rennes, refused to discuss the Hitler regime and refused to explain why they had French jewelry, money, and identity cards on them. They were all very young, (one of the worst was only 17) and they were all subsequently shot by the FFI. Even if we had wished to prevent this shooting, we would have been powerless. These men had burned farms and farmers with their wives and children all the way along the main road.

The Royal Navy Arrives. Some days before, following orders from London, we had sent east about thirty FFI to contact American forces and act as guides. On 4 August one of them came in proudly in a jeep with an officer of the Royal Navy and an officer of the Royal Marines. They were very surprised to see us, and explained that they were heading for Brest. We told them that if they had kept on their road to Chateaulin they would certainly have been killed, and gave them a guide to take them by another route. It was very nice to see them, and I hope they finally got to their destination safely.

First American Troops. The next day another guide brought in two jeeps and their officers, part of the 86th Reconnaissance. They had run into a patrol of the 2nd Paratroop Division on the road between Chateaulin and Pleyben and had been separated

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from their unit. We got them back into contact with Lieutenant Bordges, their CO. Meanwhile the population of Chateauneuf, seeing American troops go through the town, behave like the war was over and hung out French flags. A spirit of premature optimism was also abroad among the troops.

Germans came back to Chateauneuf. Our fears were justified only too soon. That same night a detachment of the 2nd Paratroop Division, on its way back from Carnaix, entered the town, killed the cure, and massacred about 50 civilians. The next day, a similar detachment ambushed an American column coming into Chateauneuf from Scaer. They destroyed all the vehicles except those which they drove off for their own use, and killed all the personnel except three, who were later picked up and brought in by our men.

We would like to state here that London knew the exact location of our HQ and should have informed US advanced units in the area of our whereabouts. If the CO of that reconnaissance column had been able to contact us he would never have run into the ambush. As it was, nobody knew of our existence. In all my contacts with US officers later, I did not find one who had any idea there were allied parachutists working in Finistere.

Move to Chateau - contact with Aloes. On 7 August we moved to the Chateau de Treverez. The day before Captain Lebel had gone off to Kerrien to make contact with Aloes. He returned to the chateau, charged with the mission of centralizing all information on the enemy in Finistere, a job which he carried on until our departure from Brittany.

Central Finistere cleared of Boche. During the next days we learned that the 2nd Paratroop Division had moved

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north to Brest, and had been harassed all along its march. Prisoners were still being brought in from all sides, and from them we learned that all German forces had received order to make for Brest, the Presqu'ile de Crozon and Lorient. By 10 August, Chateauneuf, Chateaulin, Pleyben, Carhaix, Huelgoat, Sizun, Braspars, Briec were all free of the enemy.

Crozon. The only place in our area where there were any Germans left was the Presqu'ile de Crozon. Here there were a great many, and we began concentrating all the FFI troops in our area across the neck of the Crozon peninsula to prevent them breaking out. Captain Knox made a trip to Morlaix to try to raise gasoline from the US Army. There he made the acquaintance of the 17th Cavalry Squadron, who were later to work with us in the Crozon peninsula.

Colonel Eono. Colonel Eono and his staff arrived in the area about this time and set up HQ at the Chateau de Kerrion, near Pleyben. Captain Knox was asked by Colonel Eono to arrange an interview with the general commanding the attack on Brest. Captain Knox drove to Plabennec and there met team Horace. The interview was arranged for the following day.

Braspars. The next morning Colonel Eono and Captain Knox set out for Plabennec via Braspars-Sizun. As we approached Braspars we met the commander of the FFI company which had been left in Braspars. He informed us that the Germans had that morning attacked Braspars and liberated 130 of their prisoners. He had got out and was going back for reinforcements. We immediately drove into the town, found the Germans gone, and the town in a state of complete panic. The Germans had thrown grenades into the house which

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had served as FFI headquarters and killed two women there. They had attacked the town with two American armored vehicles, no doubt the ones they had captured at Chateauneuf.

Plabennec. We proceeded on to Plabennec without further incident, and Captain Knox was left as Colonel Eono's liaison officer with General Taylor. He arranged for the delivery of 2000 gallons of gasoline to the FFI and also went on some patrols with Major Somers of team Horace (812). Upon return to Playben he learned that all of Colonel Eono's headquarters was about to return to England, and Captain Lebel and Captain Knox would act for him as G-2 and G-3 combined.

St. Renan. Captain Knox was so little pleased at this prospect that he returned to Plabennec and amused himself by working with Major Somers on a project to get the Brest garrison to surrender. Major Somers and Captain Knox tracked down a French chaplain who had come out of Brest and who had received a message for the American command from prominent naval officers in Brest. We took him back as far as we dared towards Brest, and promised to pick him up next day at Saint Renan which was no man's land. (In fact we came under shell fire before we ever got there.) He was to contact the men who had given him the message and get one of them to come out and talk to General Taylor. When we went back to get him next day we ran into fifteen Germans in Saint Renan, so we evacuated it hastily and waited for the chaplain outside. He eventually turned up, but had been prevented from entering Brest by a patrol of German paratroops.

Chateau de Kerriw. During this time Captain Lebel had been working as G-2, and organizing an information service on the

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German positions in the Crozon peninsula. He obtained very accurate and detailed information, which Captain Knox was able to pass on the General Middleton's G-3, after seeing General Middleton personally. (General Middleton is commanding general VIII Corps.)

US Troops for Crozon. Finally General Middleton sent some troops down to the Crozon peninsula - the 17th Cavalry Squadron, under Colonel Lindquist. Jedburgh team Giles worked the liaison between the US Cavalry and the FFI headquarters was at Plomodiern just at the foot of Menezhom, the hill which dominated the whole position. The town was under constant fire from 88's and mortars until the capture of Menezhom some days later.

Crozon Offensive. The 17th cavalry squadron, later reinforced by the 15th, and backed up by the FFI began an offensive with the limited objective of reducing Menezhom and St Nic. In this action the FFI and the US Cavalry co-operated magnificently, and before Giles left Finistere the whole peninsula up to Telgruc-Sur-Mer was in our hands. In the course of this action the members of the team came into contact with the enemy on the St Nic Road and at St Marie, Du Menez Hom. When we left, the offensive had come to a standstill.

APPENDIX 'A'

Drop Grounds operated by team Giles

<u>Ground</u>	<u>Location</u>
Pêche	Coadri
Poire	St. Guazec
Pomme	St. Segal
Framboise	Flourach
Amande	Serignal

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Raisin
Orange
Ananas
Groseille
Cerise
Prunelle
Mandarine
Noix

Scignac
La Feuillée
Plessis
Playben
Peniti
Huelgoat
Briec
Huelgoat

APPENDIX BCommendations

Yves Legal - Chateauneuf Du Faou. Sergeant in the French Army - captured in 1940. Escaped from Germany. In resistance movement since 1941. 6 months in prison at Rennes. Department organizer of FTP. In his work with us showed courage, ability and unquestioning loyalty. Took part in the fighting on the Crozon peninsula. A young man of great ability, courage, future.

Doctor Belin (Briec) and Doctor Olliviek Henri (Quimper).

Under conditions of illegality organized a medical evacuation service hospital and surgery. Treated many of our wounded and later saved the life of an American soldier who had been left for dead on the Chateauneuf road.

Team GilesAPPENDIX 'G'

Team Giles consisting of Captain Knox, US Army.
Captain Lebel, French Army.
Sergeant Tack, British Army.

Signals report compiled by Sergeant Tack, G.H. This is entirely a signal report and has no connection with the main report. The Jed set is, I think, about the best set possible for our particular job. It's portability and the fact that there are no batteries to worry about are two important advantages which make the set simple and easy to work. I myself, am fully satisfied with the Jed set and shall be glad

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Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)

to do any jobs in the future with it.

I would like to thank and congratulate the operators at 53C for the good work that they did for me. In all, eight-nine messages were passed on our cypher, and I can say that in very few cases did I meet with any trouble in passing these messages. This is quite an achievement, because at least five of these messages were over two hundred groups and about fifty per cent of the remainder over one hundred groups. About thirty-eight messages were received and with the exception of one they were sent in perfectly readable Morse.

I found that a good signal (QSA4 or QSA5) could be received on an aerial that was put up with common sense, with of course careful tuning of the receiver.

I found that, on the broadcast (2100 GMT) atmospherics and interference combined to disturb the signal badly and the best strength was QSA 3. Under these circumstances I had to ask for a repeat during sked times on several occasions. I was greatly gratified when, with one exception, all messages were sent during sked times. I found also that my frequencies were extremely good without exception. Although my emergency frequency was very near BBC I had no trouble at all.

I should like to end by again thanking the staff of 53C for their excellent cooperation with me.

Cipher. As a large percentage of all encoding and decoding was done by me I shall make a small report on the same. The one-time pad is the perfect code for our J93. The means of encoding on this system were counted as part of our most important equipment and never under any circumstances

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Operations. Team Giles (Cont'd)

let out of my sight. We did not use the vocabulary in any of our messages because we found that although we saved space we lost time. With an average of two messages a day to encode and one a day to decode we found time to be most important.

The first few messages from home were encoded in French and these messages we had trouble in decoding. The remainder however worked out very well indeed with the exception of five completely indecipherables. These five messages were obviously a bad slip on someone's part because the "pages on which they were encyphered had already been used once." We did not remove, under any circumstances, pages from the pad which had not been used. These five messages were received as part of a batch of thirteen taken during two skeds on one day. When these messages were taken we had reached page seventy-two of our pad. These messages were encoded before page sixty-two.