

## Report of Activities – 1<sup>st</sup> Lt Rene A. Dussaq, (Anselme)

I had volunteered to take off from England for France in a plane that was supposed to drop only packages southwest of Monneton; there was no moon. When we arrived at the spot where the packages were supposed to be dropped, contact by S-Phone had to be established with the grounds so as to notify them that a body was going to be dropped too. We had great difficulty in identifying the letter that they were sending from the ground; furthermore, the lights should have been white, but they were not. Three were red and one was white. Contact by S-Phone could not be obtained. The plane flew around for about 45 minutes (35 according to the MR), and they were hesitating to throw even the packages for fear that it was not the correct reception committee. At that time the dispatcher had told me that I should not jump, since they were not able to establish contact by S-Phone. During the conversation that ensued I just could not make myself understood by the dispatchers, because of the noise in the plane, but when they decided to make their run to drop the packages and opened the hatch, I was resolved to jump. I am not quite sure that the dispatcher gave me the signal to jump.

The plane was flying downwind, which caused me to drift enormously, and I landed some six kilometers from the spot where the reception committee was supposed to be. After a three-hour walk, I was able to establish contact with the reception committee which was still looking for packages that had been dropped all over the place.

The plane, having circled so long, had obviously alerted a German garrison located nearby, with the result that in the morning a group estimated at 500 German soldiers encircled a wood in which a small Maquis of 33 men was located. I was asked by the chief of that Maquis to take charge of the action. We were able to have the 33 boys withdrawn from the wood by taking advantage of a small river bed in the center of the wood. The Germans opened fire on each side of the wood with no other result than the killing of some of their own men. My next move was to get to Chateauroux and wait there to make contact with Hubert<sup>1</sup>. I went to a safe house which was run like a boarding house, where I met two young Maquis (Frenchmen).

The day after my arrival there, while I was in my hotel room, an agent of the Gestapo accompanied by a French inspector of police and three gendarmes came to ask me for my papers; after having seen my papers the inspector asked me to follow him to his headquarters. Having received instructions in London never to go to any headquarters should my papers incite suspicion at the time I showed them, I was able to get the inspector alone in my room, and to inform him that I would be compelled to kill him were he to insist on his plan to take me to the police station. I did not want to shoot him immediately for fear of alerting the agent of the Gestapoi who was outside with the three gendarmes. My threat was effective, and the inspector, walking out of the room and calling off his gendarmes, gave me the opportunity to escape through the window.

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<sup>1</sup> Major John Farmer, in charge of the Freelance circuit, British army.

I had contact the same night with a Maquis group, and through this contact was taken to Montluçon where I waited to be picked up by Nancy of Hubert's team, and traveled by car down to Chaudesaigues. I then made my contact with Hubert and Roland. I was then introduced to a Colonel Thomas who was the commanding officer of the réduit de Friedfont. It was part of the réduit de Monmoucher, under the military command of Colonel Gaston and the complete control of Gaspard. The total number of the Maquis in that sector was approximately 7,000 men. I was immediately put at the disposal of Colonel Thomas to train his men in all the weapons they had, and in their tactical use. I instructed the cadre of some ten companies in these weapons.

Having received information that the Germans were preparing to attack our réduit, I did all in my power to convince Colonels Thomas, Gaston, Gaspard and Prince that it was suicide to try to maintain such a large group of men in one single spot with the type of weapons they had. Unfortunately the answer I received was to the effect that what they needed were tanks and cannons brought to them so as to be able to defend their position. They went so far as to ask for Allied aviation to support them. I insisted that the weapons they had were weapons of guerilla and that their tactics should be subordinated to the weapons at their disposal. They explained that thousands of men were joining them, following the orders sent out by Algiers radio instructing all Frenchmen to join the Maquis, and that they could not very well send these men back to their homes to fall in the hands of the Germans. Under such circumstances, I decided then to participate in whatever action that was to take place in the ensuing days.

The lack of trained cadre was pitiful. Even those who had been appointed company commander had not the training necessary for such a job. Furthermore, the majority of the "Maquisards" had joined the Maquis to hide from the Germans, and it was rather difficult to change them from the hunted into the hunter.

The Germans attacked Monmoucher with a force estimated at 4,000 men. They were held in check by 1,500 FFI for a whole day. At this time I heard severe criticism of our anti-tank weapon, the bazooka. I had the opportunity of showing the staff of the FFI that the bazooka could easily stop any enemy armored car, with the result that from then on for the following four months, all the heads of the FFI in Auvergne knew me under the name of "Captain Bazooka." The FFI forces which had successfully stopped the advance of the Germans led by Geisler, the head of the Gestapo, started their withdrawal from Monmoucher during the night, after having inflicted upon the Germans a loss of 1,400 killed. With a mobile group sent from Friedfont to Clavieres, we were able to cover the withdrawal of

**Anselme's Region of Operations in the Auvergne**



the main body from Monmoucher; in that covering party we sustained the loss of some 40 men, 25 missing and 15 certainly dead.

Whenever figures of enemy casualties or our own casualties are given one should not rely too much on their accuracy for the following reasons:

1. When attacked by the Germans we would usually fight delaying actions until our ammunition would give out or our boys would just run away; therefore, we could not very well go around to count the number of dead the enemy had left on the ground. Concerning that particular action at Monmoucher, radio Vichy announced that the Germans admitted having lost 800 men. Nevertheless, three days after the action we ambushed at the Pont du Garabit two German trucks with 12 enlisted men, mostly Armenians, one German non-commissioned officer, one lieutenant, and a captain who just before dying told us they had lost 1,400 men at Monmoucher.
2. On our side we could not tell exactly how many we had lost because few company commanders kept a list of names of those under their command. When the Maquisards fell in German hands they were killed and often mutilated with all personal identity papers removed. Often some boys would run away and hide during the course of an action and reappear 50 miles away two or three weeks later.

The whole staff at Monmoucher then established a new CP at Saint Martial, and kept on repeating the mistake of assembling within a certain sector large groups of men, thus inviting the Germans to attack them once more. At such a time I asked Roland,

St. Martial, CP after the Monmoucher Encounter



the radio operator, to send a message to London, informing them that exceedingly unsound military tactics inviting disaster were being applied by the staff of Saint Martial, and that undoubtedly within a short time the Germans would again attack our redoubt and this time in great numbers in an effort to obliterate it.

The next morning Roland was to send the message. The Germans moved up on us with airplanes, armored cars and artillery. Seeing that it was useless to make Colonel Gaston understand modern tactics of guerilla weapons, I then decided to move from one company to another and give them all the assistance within my power. Ignoring the instructions given them by London, Gaspard's staff had moved to the small town of Chaudesaignes situated on an important national road running north and south.

The Germans attacked from three sides, simultaneously, placing their artillery batteries three miles north of Chaudesaignes, three miles west of Chaudesaignes and at Auterrioux on a line running south of St. Martial Maurines.

Colonel Thomas failed to encircle from the rear, the German battery situated three miles north of Chaudesaignes. Colonel Gaston placed three companies at Mallot, south of the river Truyere, instead of placing them north of the river where the terrain would have lent itself to guerilla action.

Andre, Hubert, and Roland decided to leave their CP at Friedfont and establish a momentary CP in some woods which were thought to be safe from the attack of the Germans. It just so happened that the Germans attacked exactly in that direction. Andre and Hubert, who had left Roland, four pilots and Mme. Fournier in the woods, had rejoined the CP of Colonel Gaston at St. Martial at the very moment when the Germans were making a break through the cirque du Mallet. Knowing myself that Roland and the pilots had been left in that wood, I decided to go and look for them. While I was going out to look for them, I saw that heavy action was taking place at the cirque du Mallet some 400 to 500 yards distant. I decided to go and find out what was going on, since the firing was rather heavy. I arrived at a machine gun position; this machine gun had just had a stoppage, due to bad headspace adjustment. After applying immediate action, I fired the machine gun by short bursts until we had no more ammunition in that band.

I went back into the woods in an attempt to find Roland. The Germans at the time were performing one of the poorest demonstrations of mortar fire I have ever witnessed, for as they were trying to hit a road on which a company was withdrawing, they hit my hat with a fragment of mortar shell when I was some 400 yards distant from the road. Unable to find Roland in the woods, I returned to Friedfont, which had already been completely evacuated by our forces. Knowing then that the only road to escape left me was through the Valles de la Truyere, I went in that direction and rejoined the elements that had already withdrawn some time before. There I made my contact with Andre and Hubert. The Germans at the time were entering Friedfont.

What undoubtedly led to the rout of our forces was the complete lack of liaison between our different groups and the demoralizing effect of aerial bombardment and strafing by seven German planes (JU 88) on entrained Maquisards. There were, nevertheless, many individual examples of astounding courage in the face of heavy enemy fire.

By eleven o'clock at night, I asked for some volunteers among 200 Corps Francs under the direction of Marius to come with me back to Friedfont and attack the Germans in the rear. I was met with a 100 percent negative answer, although I believe that Nancy offered to come with me. We moved off that night to a distance of some ten miles from the scene of action. At such time I decided that I would go back again to the woods in an effort to find Roland. Two days later, I found him, and on foot I led him to Saint Santin. We covered some 170 kilometers.

I would not have the faintest idea of the casualties supported on each side during our engagement, although it is a fact that great quantities of supplies, food, ammunition and explosives were lost by us. Although some leaders claimed that this action against

the Germans had been successful in view of the casualties inflicted upon the Germans, my opinion is quite different for the following reason:

While we were engaged in open battle with the Germans, heavy convoys of some 200 trucks would go north daily using the national road passing through Chaudesaignes. These convoys should have been ambushed to prevent them from reaching the Normandy coast, but since all our effectives were engaged, no unit was left to stop or slow down these convoys.

Gaspard's staff, Colonels Gaston and Prince, Commandants Laurant and Dumas, Maurice Judex and whatever effectives they had with them moved from St. Martial to le Bourguet. No worse cul de sac could have been chosen to establish a new CP.

The all around defense was entrusted to a Captain Melbourne or Simonet. By his lack of military knowledge he even increased the danger of a German attack which came a few days later. I was no longer there at the time of this attack, but I understand that Gaspard's group lost quite a few men and whatever equipment they had salvaged from St. Martial.

There was at Le Bourguet a tendency on the part of the staff to justify their successive defeats by blaming London for not equipping them with the proper weapons. I was very blunt in setting these gentlemen straight. Our efforts had been to discourage the massing of large bodies of men in any given spot. We had insisted on keeping away from towns but rather on placing small guerrilla groups to ambush German convoys along roads, blowing up bridges, and generally harassing the enemy. As for the weapons, they were excellent, and it was certainly not our fault if the men did not apply themselves more seriously to the task of learning all about them. To the credit of Gaspard, I must say that my bluntness did not alienate him but rather brought about a very fine understanding between us.

In Saint Santin, Commandant Ostertag had regrouped many of the men who had participated with him in the action at Clavieres. He was being accused by the townspeople of Saint Santin of being responsible for the death of those 15 boys who had fallen there; furthermore, the mayor of Saint Santin was very hostile to the efforts of the resistance. I went to see the mayor, and demanded that he gather the population of the town at the high school one Sunday morning where I would give them a talk. I spoke very bluntly as to the fact that if it were not for the French resistance and for those who were falling before the German bullies, France would not still be considered among the foreign nations as a fighting ally; that the Allies would win this fight with or without the resistance, and that it was advisable for all Frenchmen to put themselves at this early date on the side of the Allies in anticipation of victory day. The result of the talk seemed to be very satisfactory, for from then on we received the full collaboration of the mayor and all those under his rule.

Andre and Hubert had decided that I was to take care of the military operations in the Cantal and Haute Loire, keeping Roland as my operator, whereas they would take care of the Allier and the Puy de Dome, keeping Roger as their operator.

#### Alliers and Puy de Dome regions of the Auvergne

There seemed to be much confusion as to who was to supply the resistance with the necessary weapons, whether it would be the Buckmaster organization, the Inter-Allied mission, the COPA, or what not. Since my only interest was to go after the Germans wherever we could find them and attack them with whatever weapons we had at our disposal, I did not go into discussions as to who should supply them. I started out by



establishing the information set up that would give us complete knowledge of whatever German movements were taking place in the region. The region was under the command of Commandant Carlian, a very fine French captain of the regular army. He immediately adopted the idea of forming companies rather similar to our companies of American paratroopers. Furthermore, we formed small parties of three men that would constantly go out hunting Germans along national roads wherever the terrain would lend itself to such operations.

Obtaining false papers, I went into Aurillac and secured direct information from the German Kommandantur, which enabled us to ambush successfully a German column that was trying to leave Aurillac to rejoin their forces in Saint Flour. I made arrangements with a milician to kill La Haye, the head of the milice in Aurillac, and provided him with a silent gun.

#### St. Flour and Aurillac area

My adjutant arrested a woman from the milice who had sold to the Gestapo 18 young men from the Maquis. I sent a group of men to Paulhaguet to give me a line up of whatever Maquis would be willing to operate against the Germans if properly armed.





I myself, made different contacts. Nothing came of it, since I was told that I could not get any parachutages in the Haute Loire.<sup>2</sup> In the course of traveling from one place or another, we met with nothing much, with the exception of maybe two German barrages which cost us the loss of a car in exchange for eight Germans killed.

I then received the order to go to Ambert. We traveled in three cars in the company of Colonel Gaspard, Commandant Laurent, Judex, Hubert, Andre, Alsop, Schley. As we were approaching Ambert and crossing a route national south of Clermont Ferrand, we observed a German truck loaded with troops and mounted with a machine gun. I immediately got myself into position and opened fire with my carbine, for which I was reprimanded, since our mission was to go to Ambert and not attack the Germans. I was left in Ambert to await the arrival of 60 parachutists. I waited for five days and no parachutists arrived,<sup>4</sup> so I took it on myself to continue doing what I had done since my arrival in France; to look for Germans and attack them whenever feasible.

The nearest town where Germans were reported was Thiers. To the south of Thiers was the group of Commandant Dangou. I asked Dangou to help me block the roads around Thiers. He told me he could not do so, since it was not in his sector, but the sector of Commandant Victoire, who himself could not do it alone since he was not properly armed. I decided to do a little work, accompanied by my adjutant.

An outpost of six Germans was located 800 meters west of Thiers. My adjutant and two other youngsters removed the outpost, killing five Germans and wounding one. The reaction of the German garrison was to declare a state of siege in Thiers. All night long they fired flares. The next morning they were starting the evacuation of the German garrison. Not having the necessary personnel, we could not stop them on the road.

I recruited some French agents to obtain some information about Vichy which was to be my next move. A large body of Germans was reported at the Hippodrome, which would have made a nice prize.

The following is an account of what took place in Vichy at the time of the evacuation:

On Thursday, 17 August, Mr. Renthe Fink went to visit the Marechal. He asked him to leave Vichy to go east where he claimed that President Laval had just assembled a national assembly, and demanded the presence of the Marechal. The Marechal said that before leaving Vichy, President Laval had declared that he would not leave Paris except as a prisoner. The Marechal asked to be shown proof that Laval had left Paris. As Mr. Renthe Fink was incapable of giving him that proof, the Marechal then decided to send one of his aides-de-camp to Paris, Commandant Feat, who left the following day.

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<sup>2</sup> This is contradictory to the number of supply missions to the area, which amounted to a substantial number for the months of April, May, and June of 1944 by the Carpetbaggers alone, not counting possible SOE drops.

<sup>4</sup> Anselme's report hardly ever mentions dates, but this was most probably an OG team.

On Saturday, 20 August, Mr. Renthe Fink went back to the Hotel du Parc with a written ultimatum from Hitler. Marechal Petain still refused to go when Renthe Fink told him that he must go since President Laval was waiting for him in Belfort. At that moment Commandant Feat, who had just returned from Paris, brought a copy of the letter of resignation of President Laval and of the government, and the Marechal called Fink a liar.

Present at this meeting were: Admiral Elear; M. Rochel, secretary of foreign affairs; Admiral Fernet, general secretary to national council; General Dubency, general secretary of the chief of state.

While these events were taking place in the Cabinet, Mr. Nance and Mr. Stucki (the Swiss minister) arrived. Renthe Fink was accompanied by General von Nenebran. Marechal Petain then declared, in the presence of the diplomats, to please take note of the ultimatum with which he was being presented. Renthe Fink, nevertheless, was determined to carry out his orders. He took leave, saying that there would be a delay on the ultimatum until the next morning, Sunday, at seven o'clock. There was a threat of bombing Vichy with artillery and aviation as well as the execution of 500 hostages taken among the people. They had tanks placed outside Vichy. On Sunday morning at 0645 hours, a large body of German troops encircled the Hotel du Parc. In uniform, Captain de Trinck, the chief agent of the Gestapo in the south zone, got out of his car. Petain's guard was inside the hall, and the entrance was locked. Captain de Trinck demanded that the door be opened. They refused. The Waffen SS, who were armed with thick pliers and hammers, forced an entry. The guards inside had received orders from the Marechal not to fire, thus avoiding French bloodshed. The Captain de Trinck, preceded by his SS, who were forcing their way into various rooms, opened the door of the Marechal's room and forced the Marechal to follow them.

And so, the Marechal Petain was forced by the Germans to leave Vichy and go to Belfort. In the convoy were 200 cars with General von Nouhan, the German Ambassador Renthe Fink and the personnel of the Embassy, the Gestapo of Vichy and the Japanese Ambassador. There was an attempt to stop the convoy with reports that Dr. Minitrel had been killed, General Bridoux wounded and the Marechal kidnapped. If this was done, it was not by my groups, and I doubt seriously whether it was done at all.

Route National No. 9, Riom-Vichy, was cut by the FFI at Pontmort, so that all German convoys going to Clermont or Vichy had to go through Rendant. I secured copies of the letters exchanged between Abetz, German Ambassador in Paris, and Pierre Laval and Phillippe Petain.

I received the information that at Issoire a strong German garrison was keeping the route national open to German traffic between Saint Flour and Clermont-Ferrand. I decided then to attempt a bluff, in the hope of forcing that garrison either to evacuate and be attacked on the road, or to surrender.

In the course of an action north of Le Puy, we had taken many German prisoners, including a Colonel Schultze, two German nurses, four medical officers and twelve wounded whom we had in custody at the hospital of Ambert. We took approximately 300 men in all. They were put to work on the building of a landing ground near Ambert. I went to see the colonel, and demanded that he write a letter to the commander of the garrison of Issoire informing him that he was in my hands and that I was demanding, first, the immediate release of two civilians they were holding as



hostages in Issoire and secondly, asking him whether he wanted to surrender unconditionally to our group or to fight it out. At first Colonel Schultze did not wish to comply with my demand of writing the letter. I informed him then that my main purpose in making such a demand was to stop the German practice of warding off any attack by us by taking hostages and threatening with shooting them if we attacked them.

On a similar occasion in St. Flour, we had withheld an attack on the Germans who had threatened to shoot 40 hostages, only to find out on the following day that they had withdrawn, killing 27 hostages before leaving.

I told Colonel Schultze to say in his letter to the commanding officer of the Issoire garrison that should hostages be taken, I would see to it that all of the Germans interned by our group were killed, if possible with a jackknife. When he informed me that this would not be in accordance with the Geneva convention, I answered that I was interested only in getting the letters. In the end, he wrote the letter.

Issoire, in the Puy de Dome region



I then got in contact with Commandant Rene, whose zone of operations was Issoire. He had under his command 350 men. I told him that I had intended to drive up to the German garrison in my car with an American flag and a white flag, and that I would give to the commander of Issoire a letter written by Commandant Schultze, and find out his reaction. I asked Commandant Rene if he would place his men some six miles outside Issoire on the roads that the Germans would be likely to take should they get scared and evacuate the town. He said

he would do so.

Accompanied by an interpreter, who had been known to be slightly in favor of the Germans, and by my adjutant, Lieutenant Grillon, I drove my car to the German garrison. I stopped my car within some 500 yards of the garrison in full view of the Germans; then I got out of my car, instructing the interpreter and my lieutenant to stay where they were, and started walking toward the garrison. I waited outside the garrison for a few minutes, waiting for someone to come out. I did not think it advisable to walk straight into the garrison for the simple reason that had the German commander demanded that I prove I was an American officer, I could not have done so, for I had no identity cards, no identity disc, and my uniform was not correct. Furthermore, I speak English with a foreign accent, and it would have been very easy for the German commander to think that I was just an FFI trying to make him think that American troops were there.

A short burst of MG was fired, probably in my direction. As no one came out of the garrison, I stopped a young man on a bicycle, gave him the Colonel's letter, and asked him to take it to the German commander. With that letter, I had another, which explained that I was an American captain sent by my division which was surrounding the German garrison to ask for surrender or to fight it out.

The letter was taken to the garrison and an answer came back asking for time to discuss the situation with all the German officers of the garrison. I waited until the stipulated moment, then I decided that maybe the bluff had not worked; I returned to my car and as I was turning the car around to rejoin Captain Rene, the Germans were observed to leave by the back door of their garrison, running on bicycles, trucks and what not. Immediately, Captain Rene, who had kept some 50 men hidden in the woods 200 yards behind me to help in case the Germans opened fire on us, moved up to the garrison where a certain number of Germans were left to surrender. The others were being intercepted on the roads a little higher up. No sooner were we in Issoire than we had news that a column of 129 trucks of Germans was ten miles south of us on the route national moving towards Issoire. It was not my intention to have Commandant Rene's men enter and occupy Issoire. I had asked him to keep his men on the roads, but it was useless; whenever Germans surrendered or evacuated a town it was always impossible to curb the enthusiasm of the liberated within and the FFI liberators. Mad celebrations would ensue as if the war had come to an end.

I immediately orderered that all the trees on the road south of Issoire be thrown across the road. When the head of the German column arrived to where the first tree was blocking the road, we engaged it with the few men we had. With a bazooka, we were able to put three trucks out of action, killing a few Germans and taking the rest prisoner. One of these prisoners told us that in a German truck that gone on another road there were three American prisoners that had been taken in an action at St. Flour two days earlier.

The rest of the column had stopped at some distance away, and was turning around back to St. Germain Lembront. That same column moved up again the next morning at three o'clock, passing through the Brueil where we engaged part of it at Saint Remy, another part at Saint Babel, and finally the rest in Vic Lecomte. Only a few trucks reached Clermont-Ferrand with the news that Issoire had been attacked by a division of American parachutists. The day after the action in Issoire I was given a radiogram from Colonel Gaston, military chief of the Puy de Dome, informing me that American parachutists were operating in Issoire and instructing me to get in touch with them. Our bluff had succeeded beyond all expectations, fooling friend and foe alike. In the action some 120 prisoners were taken who were later employed to build a landing ground at Issoire. We lost only one man.

The next morning I moved up to Clermont-Ferrand where on Sunday morning the Germans had started their evacuation. They moved up towards Ganat where they met with some FFI with whom I had not had the opportunity of working. In Clermont-Ferrand



I made contact for the first time in over a month with Hubert and Nancy. They were on their way to Marseilles and told me that I should meet them at the Chateau des Fresnes near Montluçon in five days, and from there be evacuated.

In Montluçon I received a note from Captain William F. Grell instructing me to be in Paris on 20 September. I drove up to Paris, arrived there on the 19<sup>th</sup>, left my car in the care of Major William T. Hornaday, INF, and was evacuated from Paris to London on

22 September 1944.

I would find it impossible to give a list of those who by their behavior have helped the Allied cause and who might be eligible for recognition or award, for the simple reason that I have been on the road constantly, never staying in one spot more than two or three days. I went into operations with men who were total strangers. Nevertheless, I have the names of a few men who in their dealings with me, have shown themselves exceedingly helpful. If these men are to be contacted, I should be referred to as "Bazooka" for that is the only name under which I am known to the resistance:

Colonel Gaspard; Colonel Princel; Colonel Laurent; Maurice; Charlie; M. Licheron; Captain Grillon; Commandant Rene; l'aumenier Jules; M. Valentin, transporter of Aurillac; M. Madrignac, secretary to the mayor of St. Santin; Mme. Renard, Desertines, Montluçon.

I must say that one man with whom I have been associated for quite some time, the radio operator, Roland, should receive recognition for his devotion to duty, for his courage and for all the many friends that he has made in France in the name of England. He is a man who, although not a soldier, has all the qualities that one would like to find in a soldier.

My adjutant, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Grillon, showed at all times all the courage with which an officer inspires his men. I had him nominated captain just before I left France.

In the course of my many operations, I have seen a great number of cases that were bordering on heroism. Unfortunately, I was in no position to ask those people for their names or addresses. I find it even difficult to give the number of prisoners captured or where they were concentrated, and names of people to whom they were handed over for the same reason as mentioned above.

### Instructions Received

After reading this report one may get the impression that I was guilty of overstepping the boundaries of my mission.

The following is a summary of the instructions, verbal and written, I was given prior to my departure for France.

In my written instructions it was said that I was to act as an instructor of all weapons and that I was to render myself generally useful to Roland and Hubert, in whatever capacity they would deem necessary. In the verbal instructions received from Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, AUS, I was told I might be used, should an airborne landing be staged in our area, as a liaison officer organizing ground security battalions to hold the dropping area against possible enemy attacks. Major Bourne-Patterson (Br) had endorsed the idea and I was to inform Hubert of this mission contacting him in France.

Hubert, who knew I was fond of action, never objected to the active part I took in various operations. As a matter of fact, I never was in direct contact with Hubert except for a few weeks. In the course of these three weeks in Fridefont, Hubert and Nancy, who appeared to have some personal problems to occupy their minds, gave me free rein as to what I should do.

### **Dealings with Senior French Officers**

It may appear strange, on reading my report, that as a lieutenant I should have been so outspoken in my talks with senior French officers. The is that Colonel Gaspard, chief of the resistance in the Auvergne, to me this: "I am the head of the resistance in the Auvergne but I am not a trained officer. I have under me some career staff officers who have accepted for the sake of harmony although they do not fit as guerilla fighters. When in the course of your operations you come across officers who do not come up to par in action, let me know and I'll see to it that they be removed. On the other hand any man that you wish to recommend for promotion will be promoted."

I must say he kept his promise. Although Gaspard had the rank of colonel, he never objected to my bluntness but rather enjoyed it and even encouraged it.