Operations, Team Aubrey

TEAM AUBREY

Jedburgh team Aubrey was the twenty-seventh Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Aubrey were:

- Captain G. Marchant (British), code name "Rutland"
- Captain (then Lieutenant) J. Telmon (French), code name "Kildare"
- Sergeant I. Hooker (British), code name "Thaler"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Aubrey was dispatched on the night of 11/12 August to the Seine et Marne area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The organizer Armand, (Spiritualist) 2646 had a powerful circuit in the Seine et Marne region. This department, which covered the eastern approaches to Paris, was of vital importance from the point of view of railway communications. Should the Germans fall back to the line of the Seine, it would be essential to disrupt as far as possible the concentration of their effectives to the east of the river by continuous attacks on communications and harassing guerrilla activity.

Purpose of Mission

Team Aubrey was to be dispatched to assist Spiritualist in the organization of the FFI. The team would provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI and additional links between London and the FFI groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team would be dropped to a reception committee organized by Spiritualist.

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Communications

The team was dispatched with one W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible upon arrival in the field.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was to report to the intelligence officer of the nearest Allied formation and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would contact Spiritualist as soon as they arrived and he would inform them of the general situation as regards to resistance in the area.

The team was to avoid open offensive action with the exception of continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets until such time as they received orders from London.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they should, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was furnished to the team prior to its departure for the field:

a. Operational Groups, SAS and other Allied Forces in the area.

b. Resistance movements in the area.
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First Word from Field

Team Aubrey announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 12 August: (C47)

"Arrived safe with containers and material intact. Contact established with Spiritualist."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

13 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1648)

"Delighted to hear you. Agree your suggested movements but you must be careful in such a thickly populated area."

16 August From Aubrey (1649)

"Kildare at house. Spiritualist in Paris and Rutland also in Paris. Thaler ill with mumps in safe house near Meaux but can work radio from bed. Must emphasize that area designated to us is underground not maquis area, therefore impossible to operate in uniform until military activity begins in said area. We two are being supplied with papers. For security reasons it is unlikely that Thalen will transmit more than once a week. Following position German fighter airfield about to be abandoned. Will arrange that it is cleared of mines before use by our planes. MM sheet 560 east 11 MM east OG 4050 MM north 54 5 40. 15 kilometers northwest Meaux. Boundary is west railway Paris - Villers - Cotterets. South against junction railway and third class road D 241 running northeast from village St Dard to join second class road on 331 which is north boundary. Number aircraft on field 99. Airfield not usable after heavy rain."

17 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1650)

"Understood Armand had 1500 men in Meaux area. Would it not be better for you to work there than inside Paris. Thanks information on airfield."

19 August From Aubrey (1651)

"Team Aubrey okay and active. Kildare and Rutland able move freely in Paris."

19 August From Aubrey (1652)

"From Armand - SS and Schupo left for Metz. Have given orders to 500 men to take to maquis as later difficult to leave Paris. No offensive action will be taken without your orders. Always ready for SAS."
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20 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1653)

"Very interested know what Kildare and Rutland have seen lately. Please report. Do utmost attack retreating forces but without moving your men from your sector. Interested fighter aircraft. Report strength models and whether you think they intend holding airfields or are just passing through. Tell us when contact established with Allied forces. Note Xavier and other grounds temporarily suspended. Understand Charly region impossible for receptions."

26 August From Aubrey (1654)

"Following from Armand. Concentration tanks 360 counted in wood of Ferriere sur Risle of important German headquarters installed in chateau of Mondeleine. Blaees ask send all traffic through Thaler. Planes at Monige no longer bogged."

27 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1558)

"Does this mean that Blaise has stopped working. Please confirm. Meanwhile will pass all traffic through Thaler. For Armand - Allied High Command asks us congratulate you on valuable information on enemy dispositions sent recently."

1 September From Yankydoodle to Watermark (1656)

"Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker of Jed team Aubrey at this Headquarters. Request instructions as to disposal. Lieutenant Telmon killed 27 August. Detailed report to follow."

5 September From Watermark to Yankydoodle (1657)

"Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker of Jed team are to return to UK. Please give ETA and place."

7 September From Yankydoodle to Watermark (1658)

"Jed team Aubrey returning UK through Yalelock."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field

We left London at 1700 hours 11 August 1944 and drove in comfort to Harrington aerodrome some 150 miles away. After an excellent meal we settled down to watch some films as our plane was not due to leave until 0015 hours.

Everyone was extremely helpful, especially Junior Commander Davenport who accompanied us all the way from London. Our flasks were filled with rum, cigarettes were
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pressed upon us and, being the first Jeds to leave in civilian clothes, we were photographed at every stage of preparation prior to the take off. The navigator of the aircraft showed us his route. We shook hands with the pilot and at 0015 hours exactly were airborne.

The efficiency of this American Liberator crew left nothing to be desired. We knew exactly where we were all along the route and had full confidence in the dispatcher sergeant, who gave us the order at 0155 hours exactly. We all landed well (although the descent seemed faster than usual) and were met on the field (near La Plessis-Belleville) by Major Armand (Spiritualist) in person. We walked with him to St Pathus while the remainder of the reception committee dealt with the containers and packages dropped by the other two Liberator bombers who flew with us that night. There were no Germans in the immediate vicinity, the nearest being at Montge, a fighter airfield.

We accompanied Major Armand to M Leridan's house where we ate, conversed and drank champagne until the early hours of the morning. Leridan was chief of resistance in the area and had organized his village of St Pathus of some 200 inhabitants into an efficient reception committee.

After dark on the same evening (12 August) we cycled cautiously to the neighboring village of Forfry. Curfew was at 2130 and anyone caught by the Germans was likely to be shot. At Forfry we went to the "safe house" of M Flechemer, a mechanic, who lived with his mother and small daughter. This house was clean and comfortable, which was just as well since the following day Sergeant Hooker came down with a mild attack of mumps. Since there were no Germans in the village, we
fixed up an aerial to a pear tree and the invalid was able to operate his set from his bed.

Paris. On 14 August it was decided, with London's approval, that Captains Marchant and Telmon should leave for Paris, in whose eastern suburbs Major Armand had recruited a potential force of 1500 men.

At this juncture it should be explained that the densely-built over area of the Paris suburbs was far better suited to guerrilla tactics than the sparsely wooded and gently undulating countryside of the Seine-et-Marne, at this time especially bare after the harvesting of the corn. London was cabled that the 1500 men could, if necessary, be moved to the Meaux area but in our briefing we were incorrectly informed that this Maquis was already in the neighborhood of Meaux, an impression which London maintained to the end.

Captain Marchant stayed with Major Armand in Paris and was able to move around freely. He was given Spanish papers; his accent was not good enough for him to be mistaken for a Frenchman. Daily he cycled to a garage off the Boulevard Yser where he gave lectures on sabotage to mixed groups of men including a percentage of gendarmes in uniform.

To cut railway lines it was found best to combine a fog signal with one half hour time pencil means of initiation. As the lines were regularly patrolled and the charge might be seen and taken off, if no train passed within one hour, the time pencil caused the line to be cut before a patrol arrived. Train-derailing charges were placed on lines almost every night.

Since Captain Telmon was French he was invaluable as liaison officer between the various "centaines". He was
provided with papers, a motorcycle, the necessary authority and travelled everywhere. He made several trips to Forfry and maintained contact with Captain Marchant.

Of the general state of affairs in Paris at this time (14-21 August) much could be written. No electricity, 2 p.m. curfew, street fighting at night, rumors and counter-rumors, and mass executions in the Bois-de-Boulogne are some of the outstanding features. Grenades were flung into any houses prematurely showing the French flag, and many people were shot on the streets for defying the curfew order. In the restaurants there was no shortage of food or wine. Better meals could be obtained than anywhere in London — at a price. A lunch of hors-d'oeuvres, Camembert cheese and peaches for three people cost about 4000 francs. Nevertheless all restaurants were crowded.

On 21 August it was generally agreed that the time had come to leave Paris and go back to the Meaux area. Movement was becoming increasingly difficult: two of our cousins had already disappeared between Paris and St Pathus, the Germans were in retreat on all roads leading out of Paris and the Gestapo was putting a close check on all civilian movement.

**Return to Meaux Area.** On 21 August, Captain Marchant and Blaise, (Armand's radio operator) left by bicycle to travel the 45 kilometers back to St Pathus. The former wore his body belt containing the cipher silks but was unable to carry two one-time pads as they were too bulky to store on the body or hide on a bicycle. After many narrow escapes these two arrived back at St Pathus after covering some 75 kilometers in all.
On 22 August 250 German SS and Schutzpolezei moved into St. Pathus and 150 Wehrmacht into Forfry where Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker were staying. Wireless transmission became difficult especially as the Germans had searched a village 2 kilometers away for a transmitter. We suspected that we had been inaccurately D/F’d and London must excuse us if we came up on the emergency link to avoid using our schedule frequency.

From the garden at the back of the house the ground rose gently to a crest, and some 200 yards away the Germans established an AA post manned by 2 men with a spandau MG and binoculars. We will always remember one transmission from this garden. The Germans could not see the transmitter from which they were screened by an apple tree but they could see us trying to fix the aerial to a pear tree from which it consistently fell. London only received us QSA 2 and the prolonged transmission took over one hour. Owing to the presence of the Germans, London was informed that no supplies could be received for the time being.

On 24 August the Germans left St. Pathus and Forfry as rapidly as they had come and everyone breathed more freely. We sent messages confirming London that ground Xavier could again be used and we charged up the Eureka and 3-phone batteries in preparation for an interlune reception. We had some 300 armed men available but if equipment was provided could place another 700 in the field. The Germans were retreating fast through our area and we feared that by the time extra arms and/or SAS troops arrived there would be no Germans left to fight. London seemed curiously reluctant to send us extra arms during the interlune period although we had repeated in several messages that we had Rigobert’s Eureka
"Asperge" and two 3-phones in good order.

On 25 August Major Armand in his own initiative gave the order to take to the Maquis. Roads from Paris were then clear of Germans and the coast seemed reasonably clear. Almost simultaneously he received a message from London advising him not to give the order until the OK was given by them. He asked Captain Marchant whether he should cancel his orders and was advised not to as such a step would only cause confusion. Time and distance had to be borne in mind. On 26 August we put on uniforms for the first time since our arrival and awaited the arrival of the men under Captain Telmon who were unable to come that day owing to the presence of German Panzer units on the road. It is clear that Major Armand desired the men to come out by night in lorries and by diverse routes. Orders were given to avoid any offensive action against the Germans on the way.

Battle of 27 August. After a night in the woods we were informed at 0900 hours on 27 August that a convoy of some 20 vehicles had arrived at St. Pathus. The journey from Paris had not been without incident as the convoy had had a fight with a small German column. Numerous Germans were killed, 40 ORs and three officers captured and the Maquis only had 1 killed and 3 wounded - a satisfactory if untimely action.

By 0930 hours the greater part of the convoy was installed along a sunken road bordering a lake in the wood of Rougemont between Oissery and Forfry. The position was not unreasonable for organized defence as to the south there was a medium-sized lake and the ground ran gently on all
sides enabling an attacking force to be silhouetted against the skyline provided by the bare fields. To the west there was a thick wood and to the east marshy ground made the approach to the position impossible for AFV's except along the sunken road already mentioned.

Unfortunately there was no time to organize an adequate defense. Two vehicles of the convoy were attacked by a German armored car while still passing through Oissery. Simultaneously a light tank from the north attacked those who had already arrived. All arms were still on the lorries and no one seemed certain where anything was. Only two Brens were in working order, two others being clogged with grease in the same condition as when they had left the factory. There were four plats with 12 bombs but no one, with the exception of the three Jedburghs, knew how they operated. Rapid lessons had to be given in the use of this weapon as also in the priming and laying of anti-tank mines on the western extremity of our position. This was also blocked by a saloon car which straddled the sunken road from the high bank to the lake.

The first skirmish lasted almost one hour, after which there was a lull of some 20 minutes. Our casualties were two killed and five wounded in this first plan of the action. One of the wounded had his jaw broken by a plat and later another minor casualty was caused by this same weapon.

During this 20 minutes it was decided that the only course open was to disperse and the thinning out began. Some fronts had to be presented as German SS troops and two more tanks had arrived, one of which was shelling us from the far
side of the lake. The one feasible line of retreat lay through a small wood to the east and then along the bed of the stream running out of the lake. If everyone had retired at once the Germans would have closed in on this stream and it is doubtful if there would have been many survivors.

By 1230 hours it was decided that the position was untenable as in addition to the shelling a third German tank had approached along the sunken road from the west. Although barred from approaching too close by the saloon car and mines obstacle, it made things pretty hot by an enfilading fire. Orders were given for a "sauve qui peut" and everyone made for the small wood in the east including the 40 German prisoners who by this time had captured their French guards promising them that they would not be shot.

Captain Marchant's escape to the wood was barred by three men and he ran off in the opposite direction. Fire from the German tank firing along the road discouraged pursuit. He dived behind one of the parked lorries and then entered the lake where he remained for eight and half hours hidden by some bushes on the bank. The Germans must have guessed that there were survivors in the lake as later they machine gunned the lake at water's level from both sides.

At 2230 hours Captain Marchant climbed out of the lake, rolled across the sunken road and up the bank on the opposite side. Twenty five yards to his right was a German tank backed against the wood. The intention of the Germans was clear. They had set fire to farms and haystacks for a radius of some 2 miles. Anyone coming out of the wood was silhouetted against the bright skyline. The corn stubble provided no cover.
Jed Team AUBREY  Night of 11/12 Aug 44 at Harrington
L-R:
A. Chaigneau (Koldare) (FR)
Godfrey Marchant (Rutland) (BR)
Ivor A. Hooker (Thaler) (BR)

Jedburgh team Aubrey in dressing room at Harrington

Team Aubrey prior to departure with U.S. pilot
Jed team prior to departure
Jed Team AUBREY  Night of 11/12 August 1944
L-R:  
Godfrey Marchant (BR)
Ivor A. Hooker (BR)
A Chagneau (FR) KIA 27 Aug 44

ID credit: Jean-Louis Perquin
Captain Marchant crawled for five hours until he was passed the brightest fire and then got up and walked ten miles north by compass to Nanteuil, where he sheltered in a farmhouse. The following night (28 29 August) he returned to Forfry as he was anxious for news.

On the 30th, American patrols arrived at Forfry and on the same day Sergeant Hooker came out from Paris in a jeep to find Captain Marchant.

We returned to Paris and thence via Normandy to England by air.

Known casualties in the action and retreat are some 86 killed. The Germans shot all our prisoners and wounded, including one nurse, and burned the corpses. German killed numbered some 45.

Captain Telmon was killed by a shell from a Tiger tank while assisting another nurse to escape along the bed of the stream already mentioned.

We would like to acknowledge the help given us by all members of the French community who assisted us not only at the risk of their own lives but also those of their families. If one name has to be mentioned it is that of M. Leridan of St. Pathus who, for four years a backbone of French resistance, was captured and shot by the Germans on 28 August.

Report by Sergeant I. Hooker of Team Aubrey covering the period he was separated from other members of his team.

I arrived at the safe house in Forfry (Seine et Marne) on 12 August 1944. On the 13th Captains Marchant and Telmon left for Paris. I was in wireless communication with London most days except when German activity made it too dangerous.
to send. I posted at least two sentries every time I transmitted. Flecherrer, the owner of the safe house, and a young lad named Andre Gagneux. They were most useful in this work and also for turning the generator handle. The Germans put a machine gun nest about 200 yards away on the crest of the hill which the road climbs leaving Forfry. From here they could see clearly the house where we were working except for one tree which blocked off just enough room to work in. I came down with mumps two days after I arrived and was rather unhappy for a few days. This probably explains why I did not answer on some skeds. I had no traffic anyway, but London sent QTC and eventually when I did answer asked for corrections of a message which I had sent two days earlier. Also, I sent a message asking for all traffic on my alternative day frequency and sent the numbers of the spare code books because we had left the others in Paris. I had reason to believe they had my main day frequency tapped as there were two German trucks floating around the area to get contact. I had to reply on my KDF for two skeds and I had sent the message asking for a change on the emergency link to get it more quickly attended to. The 2 o'clock broadcast was impossible to get as interference was so heavy and the 6 o'clock, though a very awkward time, was quite good at most times.

When Captain Marchant came back we spent two more days at Forfry and then went out with Major Armand (Spiritualist) to meet the Maquis. The first day the journey was impossible due to enemy tanks on the road.

On the second day the Maquis arrived at about 1100 hours and a battle ensued. I spent most of the time showing the Maquis how to load and fire Bren guns which incidentally were
full of grease. I also showed them how to load and fire the 4 pints and helped to carry the wounded to safety. The German officers were helping our nurses most efficiently. The order was given to disperse. Captain Telmon helped one of the nurses and set off down the stream. I followed when the others had gone because I was directly under the orders of Captain Marchant and I wanted to see what he was going to do. He told me that he was staying and told me to head for the woods. Seeing no future in remaining, I went. I worked my way along this stream, and caught up to Major Armand. I stuck with him as I saw Captain Telmon advancing along the stream some 30 yards ahead. He disappeared round a bend and at that moment a shell exploded just where he was. I heard the nurse scream and thought Telmon had had it.

We thought we were cut off so I ditched my codes and waited under a bank. Armand was with me. I heard a tank just overhead and heard voices and the wireless Morse from inside, so we stayed put for about three hours. We reached Thomas’s farm where we met the nurse who was with Telmon; her nerves were shattered and she was nearly hysterical. She told me that the captain in civilian clothes (Telmon) had been killed just beside her and another fellow with her described how Telmon collapsed when the shell exploded. We left them and Major Armand, some four others and I headed for the woods. We made our way along this stream for approximately another two kilometers. We were pretty exhausted as the mud was about 2 feet deep and we were advancing on our stomachs. We reached the woods and Major Armand gave out various orders. Two of us then set off for a safe house. On the way
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we met a young girl, Jacqueline de Baets, who asked us to her home. We arrived at this place (Mongloire par Puisieux) and bought some clothes, our uniforms being buried. We stayed there for one day. The next morning we heard a machine gun battle. We went out to investigate and found the American column advancing along the road to Doissons by devious routes. We got a lift to Meaux where an American CIC officer took us on to Paris where we went to HQ at "Les Invalides" where I got a change of clothes and Major Armand was sent back to London.

Financial Statement

Received ------------------- 100,000 Frs
Recovered ------------------- 33,000 Frs
Total 133,000 Frs

Expense
Clothing ------------------- 8,000 Frs
Expenses in Paris -------- 6,000 Frs
Lost in Battle --------- 76,000 Frs
Given to Escapee --------- 15,000 Frs
Reward to finder
of money ------------------- 8,000 Frs
To owner of safe house----- 15,000 Frs
Incidental expense-------- 5,000 Frs

Total 133,000 Frs

Sergeant Hooker

Received ------------------- 50,000 Frs

Expense
Lost in rucksack -------- 35,000 Frs
Purchase clothing -------- 8,000 Frs
Living expenses -------- 7,000 Frs

Total 50,000 Frs