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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team GuyTEAM GUY

Jedburgh team Guy was the 13th Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Guy were:

Captain A. Dhomas (French), code name "Dronne"

Captain A. A. Trofimov (British), code name "Gironde"

2nd Lieutenant J. Deschamps (French), code name "Dordogne"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Guy was dispatched on the night of 11/12 July to the southern part of the department of Ille et Vilaine in France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Guy was being sent to the Brittany area where resistance forces were being organized extensively. Maquis groups had been reported in the Rennes/Vitres area of Brittany, but there was no definite information on them. Jedburgh George (1089) had reported 4,000 partisans in the Redon section who were in need of arms.

There were several Jedburgh teams in this area at the time team Guy was dispatched, and plans were being made to send more teams. Team George had been dropped on the night of 9/10 June to the Morbihan section but had since moved to the area around Loire Inferieure. An additional Jedburgh team was being dispatched to this latter area.

Team Frederick (1086), also dispatched on the night of 9/10 June, was operating in the western part of the department of Cotes du Nord. Another Jedburgh was being sent to work in the eastern part of this department.

Team Giles (1087) was dispatched on 8/9 July to work in the Finistere area, team Gavin (1090) was being sent to the northern part of Ille et Vilaine, and plans called for three additional

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teams to be sent to the Brittany area.

Purpose of the Mission

In cooperation with SFHQ's over-all plan for organizing resistance groups to the greatest possible extent in the Brittany section, Jedburgh team Guy was being dispatched with the particular assignment of organizing and arming resistance in the Ille et Vilaine department.

Specifically its task was to organize the department for the reception of stores and equipment for 2,500 men.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Guy was dispatched with team Gavin to ground "Hamac".

Scale of Air Support Likely

The team was informed that it could expect substantial supplies of arms. These would be confined to standard loads, however, the contents of which were explained to the team.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. At the request of Colonel Bono (#829) 500,000 additional francs were supplied to the team for operational use.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. There was an SAS group operating in the Morbihan section of Brittany. Should the team encounter this or any other SAS group it was to assist them as far as possible, but it would not come under their command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. All of the Jedburgh teams operating in the Finisterre, Morbihan and Cote du Nord sections of Brittany were to be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, Commanding Officer of the SAS group in Brittany.

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An Allied Mission. The team would be directly under the command of ZMFFI. At the outbreak of guerilla activities Colonel Bono, a French officer, would be dispatched to the field. Upon his arrival to take command the team would come under his direct orders. The team was introduced to Colonel Bono before its departure.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If the team was overrun by Allied forces, it was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to anyone, not even to this officer, but merely ask him to pass them to the nearest SF staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SPHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival the team would be placed in contact with persons who would arrange for its movement to the Ille et Vilaine area and for its making contacts with the resistance leaders in that department. These leaders would be of assistance in establishing other groups.

Attacks against German troops were to be avoided, except when necessary to fulfill orders from SPHQ. If attacked by superior enemy forces, the team would break off action and disperse. General guerilla action against the Germans in Brittany would begin on the passage of the following message during the BBC French news broadcast: "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Ferros-Guirec."

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

If conditions in the area to which the team was dispatched should become completely untenable, it should inform headquarters. Thereupon the team would attempt to make its way to one of the surrounding resistance areas.

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If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner the members were taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and each should give his name, rank, and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its departure:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of petrol and ammunition dumps.
3. Knowledge regarding existent airfields and other defenses.
4. Police and Gestapo locations.
5. Topography of the area.
6. Location of strategic roads and railways in the area.

First Word from Field

Team Guy's safe arrival in the field was reported in the following W/T message from Team Gavin (1090).

"Guy okay. Set not working."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

(Team Guy's W/T set was smashed on the drop so his communication was poor.)

3 August From SFHQ to Guy (1091)

"You and Gavin must return London to study new mission. Have yourselves sent through C-2. Then request to be sent to SF Det of Army Hq who is being advised by us. Send similar instructions Gavin."

5 August From Guy (1092)

"Contact made with American Jed. Requests Felix to cover communication lines on march to Brest."

7 August From Guy (1093)

"Mission finished. Dronne is joining me. Awaiting orders. Broadcast impossible send message over skeds."

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Operations, Team Guy (Cont'd)10 August From SFH, to Guy (1094)

"As your mission is finished contact SF Detachment to have yourself returned to London urgently."

Report on Activities of Teams Guy and Gavin - 7 July to 23 Aug 44

The following report covers the activities of teams Guy and Gavin, who worked together in Brittany. This report was prepared by the team members and dictated by Captain Dreux.

Mission

Both teams were alerted on 7 July and briefed in London on 8/9 July. The mission of the two teams was to go to the department of Ille et Vilaine, team Gavin having the sector north of Rennes and team Guy having a sector south of Rennes. Both teams were to locate fields suitable for dropping men and materials and to organize and equip the resistance groups in the area. No action was to be taken until a signal was received from London. We were told that all contact had been lost with resistance groups in Ille et Vilaine since March 1944 and that we would have to establish our own contacts. No information whatsoever concerning resistance groups or conditions in Ille et Vilaine were given us at the briefing.

Action at the Airfield.

Both teams were taken to the airrome and Gavin took off in a Liberator at 1040 hours and Guy took off at 1045 hours. The crossing was uneventful and we arrived over the dropping ground at approximately 1330 hours. Team Gavin was dropped several hundred yards away from the field and team Guy was dropped half a mile away. In both cases the planes were not flying in the direction of the lights. Nevertheless all members arrived safely with only minor bruises.

We were dropped near Courcité in Mayenne which was about

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75 miles from the area where we were to work. As will be shown later, this caused us considerable difficulty.

We had bad luck with the packages. Guy's radio set was smashed, the three carbines belonging to the team were also smashed and the rucksack belonging to Deschamps was lost.

Establishing Contact

We were received by a reception committee headed by Barbier from the BOA for the department of Mayenne. We were taken to a nearby farm where we spent the rest of the night and day and on the night of 12 July we moved, Gavin going to the home of the cure Courcite, while Guy went to a resistance just outside Courcite.

In the meantime we had seen Roger of the BOA who was head of the BOA for four departments and Graffier the DMR of the BOA for the western region. They told us they had no contact whatsoever with Ille et Vilaine since early March 1944.

On the night 14 July we moved out of Courcite and went to a farm house near St. Thomas. When we arrived at the farm we still had been unable to establish contact through the BOA. At this point Major Jeanclaude got into civilian clothes as best as he could, although he still had to wear his army boots. He had no identity papers whatsoever. He made several long bicycle trips during the next seven or ten days in a vain effort to establish contact. On 15 July he saw a Colonel Michelin who was head of the staff for M region. He met him at Rouez, 4 kilometers south of Ville le Guillaume. He also saw General Rodolph, head of the sector M.4. Michelin said he would try to establish contacts for us in Ille et Vilaine.

On 21 July Major Jeanclaude had an appointment with Michelin at the same place, but Michelin did not come.

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On 20 July Major Jeanclaude saw Colonel Laboureur, one of the leaders of the resistance in Mayenne. Colonel Laboureur suggested that the two teams work in Mayenne.

On 23 July Major Jeanclaude saw Laboureur at Epineux, 7 kilometers southeast of Sable. A man named Fonction was there, Fonction being the military representative for the M. sector. They told Jeanclaude that they had contact with the southern sector but no contact with the northern sector of Ille et Vilaine. It was then decided that Gavin would work in Mayenne, while Guy would leave to go to the southern sector of Ille et Vilaine.

On 24 July we contacted Dennis of the Maquis at St. Mars 7 kilometers east of Courcille. Dennis, apparently a British agent, immediately put us in touch with Tanguy (Lulu), the leader of the FTP for the departments of Orne, Manche, Mayenne, Sarthe, Ille et Vilaine, Cote du Nord and Morbihan.

Much to our surprise and disgust we learned from Dennis that there were two dropping grounds in Ille et Vilaine which had been used and that we could have been dropped there. On 30 July Dennis arranged to have another radio set dropped on one of these grounds for team Guy

The question of establishing contact, of moving ourselves and our equipment, namely our rucksacks, radio sets and two Eurekas to Ille et Vilaine proved to be the curse of the entire operation. For some reasons, which we still do not understand, headquarters in London had, or could have had, contacts with Ille et Vilaine since FTP were operating there and receiving material by parachute. Similarly instead of being dropped 70 or more miles from our sector we could have been dropped directly in Ille et Vilaine on one of the fields which Dennis knew of and had used, or at the worst we could have been dropped in the Cote du Nord where another team had been dropped and there

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we would have been closer to Ille et Vilaine than we were when we dropped near Courcite.

We noticed that there was apparently quite a bit of friction between FTP and Dennis on the one hand and Michelin Laboureur and General Rodolphe on the other. Barbier had received orders from his leaders not to let us get in contact with Dennis or FTP. As a result we wasted eleven precious days while Jeanclaude was forced, at considerable risk to himself, to make long bicycle trips throughout Mayenne in a vain effort to establish contact. When contact was established, it was not established through BOA who were not even able to furnish Jeanclaude with civilian clothes or false papers, but through Dennis and FTP.

So much for the question of establishing contact. The difficulties of moving 75 miles across enemy-held country to work in our assigned sector should be stressed. We were in an area in which the Germans were very active and being in uniform we could only move by night. Even if we had been in civilian clothes and had had false papers, we could not have moved during the day and carried our equipment, since we would have attracted attention. This meant we could only move at night during the hours of darkness, giving you about 6 hours. When you have to consider the weight of the equipment to be carried and the fact that walking at night we covered about an average of 2½ miles per hour, it can readily be seen that moving 75 miles is a slow and tedious process. Furthermore when you carry all that equipment you are not in a very good position to defend yourself should you stumble on a German patrol. It is probably true that in a region where the resistance groups control an entire area the question of moving 75 miles with considerable equipment

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would not be so difficult. But in an area such as Mayenne where there were no Maquis and where the Germans were very active, the problem of moving was indeed a difficult one.

During the time that we waited in our hide-out near Courcité while we sought to establish contact, Barbier had provided us with young men of the resistance who acted as bodyguards and "Jacks of all trade". These young men were named Emile, Louis and Marcel. When we did move off Marcel, Emile and Louis came with us to help carry our equipment.

Situation in Mayenne

There were no Maquis except 30 men in the Maquis of St. Mars. There were supposedly about 4,000 men, most of them living in farms as farm laborers. There were some arms that had been stored and not distributed.

There was no action against the enemy except by a small group of three or four men of the FTP working to harass enemy communications.

There was no contact or liaison between FTP and other resistance. There was considerable friction between the leaders, so much so that Michelin and Laboureur had ordered Barbier not to put us in contact with Dennis and Tanguy.

Situation in Ille et Vilaine.

According to Laboureur they had had no contact with Ille et Vilaine for three months. The gestapo was very active and rendered resistance activities extremely difficult but not impossible.

However, Tanguy and FTP had been organized for two years and had been working for one year. They had been very active in the region of Bazouges and Antrain. An attempt had been made to set up a Maquis at Broualan but this Maquis was

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immediately attacked by the Milice and had to disperse. The FTP men fought with arms they took away from the Germans or stole from them. They used explosives which they likewise had to take from the Germans and detonators which had been made by chemists (drugists). Tanguy said that they had had no contact with London but had been receiving a little material since July through Dennis. Tanguy said that resistance groups other than the FTP lacked leaders, were not armed, had done no work at all, had no contact or liaison.

Movement to Ille et Vilaine

We left on the night of 25 July having previously arranged to send all our baggage except our arms and rifles, which we kept with us, in a doctor's car. The car took this material to Nyort which we were to reach on the second night.

Tanguy had arranged to have a guide for us and we left on 25 July in uniform. We reached Hardanges where we were put up in a safe house. The next night we reached Nyort where again we were put up in a safe house. All these arrangements having been made by Tanguy. At Nyort it was decided that Major Jeanclaude and Captain Dhomas should change into civilian clothes and bicycle with Tanguy. They were to go with bicycles to Ille et Vilaine to contact people designated by Tanguy. While Jeanclaude and Dhomas thus went ahead to speed up the arrangements, the rest of the party was to follow on foot travelling at night.

The following night the rest of the party which I headed, reached a point 1 kilometer from Corron where we were to have been met by a guide. Unfortunately, no guide was there because of Gestapo activity at Fougerolles. The guide was to have come from Fougerolles and was to lead us back there. There being no

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guide, and since it was getting light we hid as best we could off the road and I sent Louis to procure a bicycle and go back to Nyort to pick up lost contact. However we were fortunate in regaining contact through a man named Rossiginol and he explained why the guide had been unable to meet us. Rossiginol took us to a safe house for the night while we waited to find out what the next stage of our journey was to be. The following day we were still waiting to find out where we were going. In the meantime we had got into contact with two gendarmes Placard and Leray who were most helpful. In fact much more so than Rossiginol who was rather a dangerous man because he talked too much. Tanguy in the meantime had arranged to send us a guide who was to take us to Le Ferre in Ille et Vilaine, that is to say he was to lead us near there. We were to meet Tanguy at Le Ferre. Meanwhile we had decided that travelling on foot and at night was entirely too slow since time was very important, so we arranged through a Frenchman in Carron to buy a second-hand car for which I paid 10,000 francs. The car was to be delivered to us at a side road near Gorrion about a mile and a half away. That night at about 1030 we set off to pick up the car. We found the car along with the person who was selling it and two civilians. We pushed the car into the road and were about to get it started by pushing it when suddenly a German TCV rolled up and eight Germans surrounded the car which was blocking the road. The others had seen the German vehicle at the last second and had been able to escape and hide in a nearby hedge but Lieutenant Masson, Marcel and I, who were in uniform, were unable to get out of the car before the Germans were on top of us. This was a rather ticklish situation inasmuch as the Germans had their weapons in their hands

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and we had not. We got out of the car and got our weapons out and I was about to fire on the Germans when I suddenly realized that they were quite confused and did not grasp the situation very well and, therefore, that it might be possible to slip away without having to fire. The leader of the German patrol kept asking me questions in German to which I replied by okay and various uncomplimentary English expressions all of which evidently puzzled him very much. As it turned out, it was a good thing I decided not to fire because this would have certainly given the alarm and even had we been able to knock off a few Germans and escape, we would later have been hunted and it would have been practically impossible for us to reach Le Ferre as we did.

I later learned that shortly after we left, the Germans did send some patrols to investigate and were firing but they could not have been firing at us because at that time we were some distance away.

To continue, I told Marcel to slip away and this we did. I still do not know how we bluffed our way out of that one but we did.

Eventually the Germans left having pushed our car off to one side. Before leaving I had given the order that in case of difficulty we were to reassemble afterwards by means of whistle signals and that in case we were unable to reassemble, those who were unable to contact the rest of the group were to report back to the last safe house.

After the Germans disappeared we immediately got out of the hedge and reassembled, all except Trofimov and Louis who had been the first to disappear. We spent half an hour looking for them and giving whistle signals but were unable to

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to contact them. Since time was all-important and unless we were able to establish contact with Tanguy next day as arranged we would be in a very difficult situation, I decided to move off so we got in the car which the Germans had conveniently left and drove off through Colombiers. We passed under the noses of German sentries in the streets who let us by without stopping us. The car had been camouflaged with branches so as to resemble a German vehicle as much as possible.

The balance of the trip was uneventful since when we passed Germans the car worked wonderfully and only broke down when there were no Germans near by. Early next morning we reached a spot near Le Ferre and our driver drove on to Le Ferre and saw Major Jeanclaude and Dhomas who had come there and told them where we were. We went to a safe house which we had learned of purely by chance. When we went back for the car two days later we found it had been taken by Germans or civilians, I do not know which.

However I consider the car was well worth the price because it enabled us to cover the last 60 miles of our journey in one night whereas had we been walking it would have taken at least four nights. And as previously stated, time was an important factor.

Report by Captain A. A. Trofimov of Team Guy

Gorron. On Sunday, 30 July, we were scattered by a German patrol just as we were setting off for our next RV. I, together with one partisan, Louis, was unable to rejoin my group. We returned to the point de repli, a safe farm. From there we moved to another farm leaving instructions to send on to me any of the others who might follow.

On Monday gendarmes Leray and Plassart informed us that

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the others had managed to continue with their journey. I sent Louis to Le Ferre, the rendezvous, to try and contact the others.

Louis returned on Tuesday having failed to contact the others. I then got into civilian clothes as the whole area was packed tight with Germans.

On 2/3 August received from gendarmes Leray and Flassart a civilian identity card and refuge card, thereby enabling me to watch the roads and find out exactly what equipment the Germans were retreating with. With Louis we went into Gorron and found out what preparations were being made to defend the place. We discovered the exact positions of the machine guns. There were 4 - 500 SS to defend the town, 2 large tanks, 2 semi-tracked cars. The civilians were forced to remain in the town by barricades on all exits.

On Friday I sent Leray to the American headquarters at Landivy with all possible information. That night the Americans made a first tentative attack on the town. Louis and I went into the town during the attack and watched their preparations. The town was not taken that night.

Together with a guide I set off Saturday for Landivy. Enroute I met a Major Ward at Lezare with an advance American patrol. We discussed the methods by which Gorron could be taken. He went to his headquarters and returned with the information that they did not know when or by which unit Gorron was to be taken. I decided to return immediately to Gorron. At Saint Coulomb I met Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Oliver of the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, who was to attack Gorron. We discussed the best way of approaching the town, which was by a road hardly protected at all. At 7 p.m. we entered the town,

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after a small exchange of rifle fire, but the town was taken without a single shot fired on it.

I showed the colonel which route the Germans who had fled at the last moment had taken, and attached myself to Major Ward to act as interpreter for civilian problems. The gendarmerie worked very well indeed taking control over the excited people.

On Sunday I set off for the headquarters 1st United States Infantry Division where I met Major Maxwell Rosenthal, G-3 (Operations). He told me that he had only received the information I sent back after Gorron was in American hands.

From there I went to the headquarters, Third Army, finding it extremely difficult to locate SF Staff. I gave my report.

On Monday I rejoined team Guy at Combourg.

In the meantime our personal belongings and radio remained camouflaged near Nyort and were to be transported to us as soon as possible. However, the two Eurekas had been taken by two women agents working with Tanguy and were likewise to be brought to us, but unfortunately when we were finally able to begin to straighten out, both the Eurekas and the women had vanished.

As previously stated Jeanclaude and Dhomeas had gone ahead in civilian clothes without any identity papers whatsoever to establish contact. They went to Fougerolles and on 27 July at 8 o'clock in the morning the Gestapo encircled the town. Jeanclaude and Dhomeas were lucky in being able to escape, having been warned that the Germans were coming seconds before they arrived. Jeanclaude and Dhomeas were, of course, exceedingly fortunate because the slightest examination would

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have revealed that they had no identity papers and from that point on their future would not have been a particularly happy one. Also they were travelling in an area where the Gestapo and Milice had both been very active.

Jeanclaude contacted Tanguy at Landivy and on the 29 July contacted the various leaders of the resistance elements at Ille et Vilaine at Tintac, 12 kilometers southwest of Cambourg. Jeanclaude and Dhomas immediately located 6 fields for parachuting. On the 30th they went to Linard and contacted leaders of the FTF and also team Felix at Jugon in the Cote du Nord.

On 31 July Dhomas and Jeanclaude joined the balance of the group, except Trofimov and Louis, near Le Ferre.

Work Done in Ille et Vilaine

On 1 August we left Le Ferre and moved to St. Christopher 16 kilometers southwest of Fougere; there we stayed with the cure who had led the resistance in that area and had been very active.

Next day we went to Combourg and found that the Americans were already there. Several days prior we had learned that the Americans were advancing rapidly down towards Avranches but we had not expected to be overrun quite so soon. We spent the period from 1-6 August at Combourg. During this time we saw Major Brousseau and also contacted various resistance members of the FTF in the northern sector of Ille et Vilaine.

On 3 August Captain Dhomas was asked by a member of the CE Staff to go to the headquarters of the 6th Armored Division at Loudeac and there he was told that the resistance groups could serve a very useful purpose by rounding up all the Germans in the area, patrolling and generally acting as covering forces to guard the lines of communication while the 6th

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Armored Division ploughed ahead very rapidly. We undertook this work with the following groups: Louvigne du Desert, Antrain, Bazouges, Combourg, Bonnemain, St. Pierre de Plesguen, St. Dommineuc, Tinteniach, Montours.

During the course of this operation these groups succeeded in taking 1400 prisoners, who were for the most part taken to Tinteniach and Combourg. On 6 August we were told that there were still some Germans resisting in the area of St. Pierre de Plesguen about 11 kilometers west of Dinan and that these Germans were in a position to harass our own lines of communications. Therefore Captain Thomas and I led a group of about 50 from St. Pierre de Plesguen east. We encountered no Germans whatsoever. When we reached the outskirts of Dinan we saw that both bridges were blown up and that the Germans had evacuated the city. Captain Thomas and I decided to leave the group and go ourselves to Dinan and investigate. We took the guide with us, and we were the first Allied officers to enter the city which had just been evacuated by the Germans. President Roosevelt could not have received a finer welcome than we did.

We contacted leaders of resistance in Dinan, explained the situation and told them what their mission should be. We came back across the river and ran into an American tank destroyer outfit which had just reached this area and was engaged in firing on some scattered Germans.

On 7 August we learned from the leader of the Tinteniach group that the 83rd Infantry Division, with headquarters at St. Pierre, approximately 4 kilometers north of Chateauneuf, was very anxious to have the assistance of resistance groups in that area. We immediately drove to the headquarters of

General Farentaugh was very glad to see us and explained that we could render valuable service by patrolling and holding the area from Cancale east St. Malo while the division attacked the German defenses at St. Malo and St. Serven. General Macdon was a little worried about small German craft near St. Malo and possible enemy infiltration in the sector we were to hold. He told the General we would be only too glad to undertake to do this for him provided we had the necessary rations, etc. We were furnished with "C" rations for the men, blankets, gasoline, captured German rifles and machine guns and grenades, etc. In the meantime we had sent for the various resistance groups, among them the Combours and Tintenniac groups. The Combours group was composed largely of Senegalese and Algerians who had been prisoners of war and had escaped. They had no arms whatsoever. The next day we had a total of a little over one hundred men and we left for Cancale. We led patrols east of St. Coulomb. We saw no Germans. The following day we pushed on to La Guimorraie where we set up headquarters. In the meantime we had kept in close liaison with the 2nd battalion of the 329th Infantry which was

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in the sector south of us and with Colonel Thompson of the 60th Engineers who were operating in and south of Cancale. By keeping liaison with the troops actually in the field we were able to occupy and patrol important sectors which would otherwise have been left uncovered. We had orders to have outposts at observation points along the coast, to patrol constantly and to push ahead until we encountered German resistance. On 9 August Captain Dhomas led a patrol of approximately 15 men to Rotheneuf and encountered no Germans. In the meantime I led a patrol of approximately 15 men towards La Bastille about 1 kilometer south of Rotheneuf. We had been warned that the German anti-tank line ran through there and that the Germans had pillboxes and machine guns installed there, but I decided to push ahead to investigate whether the Germans were still manning those positions. We advanced to about 100 yards of the anti-tank line and I pushed on ahead to a good observation point but I could see no sign of the Germans. However, we soon realized that they were there because we came under machine gun fire, two of our men being wounded. The patrol withdrew.

That night we established ourselves at Rotheneuf keeping our posts along the coast and scouting the roads which led up to 1 kilometers west of Rotheneuf. This fortress was held by the Germans and was attacked the following day by the 2nd battalion of the 329th Infantry Division. We were helpful in being able to point out the various routes leading to the fort. In fact Jeanclaude went with one of the attacking companies. The fort fell to the Allies that afternoon. We were then ordered to send patrols south and east of Fort Lavarde in order to clean up isolated German resistance. We sent out these

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patrols and during the course of the operation four of the men, including Lieutenant Cormier a French reserve officer, ran into an S-mine and were wounded. Lieutenant Cormier was very severely wounded.

After completing these patrols we were asked to move our men, who number approximately 115, south to occupy positions along the east bank of the river Rances. We were to establish outposts there, send out patrols and prevent any German infiltration across the river from the west of the bank, while the 83rd Division attacked towards Dinard from the south. We moved our men in position keeping in close liaison with the 329th Infantry. However shortly after we learned that progress on the west bank had been unexpectedly rapid and there was no longer any need for a covering force on the east bank. The only remaining position was at the citadel of St. Malo which position was being attacked by advanced columns of the 83rd Division. General Farenbaugh thanked us for the work he had done and agreed that we should send back the men to their homes.

Feeling that our work in Ille et Vilaine was terminated, we communicated with London accordingly. We then contacted the British 2nd Army near Vire and they arranged for our dispatch home on board an LCI.

Conclusion

Unfortunately we were never really able to accomplish our mission as contemplated. I think we were able to render valuable service to the 6th Armored Division and to the 83rd Infantry Division, but this was not in line with our mission. The reasons we were unable to accomplish our mission are the following:

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1. We were dropped approximately 70 miles away from the area where we were to work although we could have been dropped in the actual department or in the Cote du Nord at a field closer to our area.

2. We were sent out without any contacts and the BOA were unable to establish any for us. Also we had no information whatsoever either at the briefing nor could the BOA in the field give us any. Nor could they provide us with civilian clothes or false papers.

There were contacts with Ille et Vilaine but we had to make these ourselves with the FTP. In addition the work that we had to do in establishing contact and trying to organize resistance in that area could have been done by agents and not by a Jedburgh team operating in uniform.

It was only two days before our return to England that Major Jeanclaude was able to contact Major Adam, leader of the FFI in Ille et Vilaine and he gave Major Adam a report on our work. This meeting took place in Rennes.

In Ille et Vilaine the resistance groups worked very effectively. They took over 1400 prisoners and destroyed over 100 trucks. The assistance given the 6th Armored Division and the 83rd Infantry Division was very much appreciated by the commanding officers and their staffs. It was only resistance groups that fought.

As regards the radio, the two operators report that occasionally they worked with operators at the home station who were rather mediocre and not aware of our difficulties. During certain skeds it was impossible to work because of interference. The two operators say that on the whole the operators of 53 worked very well.

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Operations, Team Guy (Cont'd)Personal Note by Captain Dreux

I cannot close this report without a word of praise for the work done by Major Jeanclaude and Captain Dthomas. They did excellent work under very difficult conditions and at great personal risk. They were at their best when the going was toughest. I particularly want to stress the work of Major Jeanclaude. It has been my privilege to work with and under some exceedingly fine officers but, in my opinion, he tops them all.

Financial Statement for Teams Gavin and Guy

Received ----- 500,000 Frs

Expenses

Groupe de Combours	-----	40,000
Groupe d'Evran	-----	50,000
Groupe de Saint Pierre	-----	15,000
Groupe de Saint Dominic	-----	5,000
Groupe de Saint Melloir	-----	10,000
Groupe de Vieux-Vy	-----	2,000
Groupe de Cancale	-----	10,000
Groupe de Saint Coulomb	-----	5,000
BOA Mayenne	-----	23,000
Total	-----	160,000
Unaccounted	----	4,000
Returned	-----	336,000
		500,000 Frs