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JEDBURGH

Operations. Team FelixTEAM FELIX

Jedburgh team Felix was the eighth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

Captain J Kennevel (French), code name "Carnavon"

Captain J J Marchant, (British), code name "Somerset"

Sergeant P. Calvin, (British), code name "Middlesex"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Felix was dispatched on the night of 8/9 July to the Cotes du Nord area in France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Felix was being dispatched to the Brittany section of France where two Jedburgh teams were already operating - team Frederick (813) in the Cotes du Nord area, and team George (814) in the Loire Inferieure. There were also two SAS bases operating here - Dingson (815) in the Morbihan section, and Grog (816) in the Loire Inferieure.

From reports received from these groups it was estimated that there were the following resistance groups in the Cotes du Nord:

Number of Resistants -- 2,500

Armed ----- 900

SAS ----- 75

To be armed ----- 1,600

Purpose of the Mission

Resistance had been very active in Brittany. Since large supplies of arms and materials had been sent out, it had been possible to maintain the cutting of communication lines despite strong oppressive measures by the Germans. No controlled area had been established as yet, however.

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It was planned to bring resistance to its maximum effectiveness during the month of July. In order to accomplish this ten Jedburgh teams were being dispatched. Team Felix was to work in the Cotes du Nord area with team Frederick.

During the first part of the month no action was to be undertaken, but stress was to be placed on organizing and arming resistance groups. About the middle of July a senior French officer would take over command of all resistance in Brittany and guerrilla operations would begin. The signal for the beginning of these operations was the following BBC message:

"Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec".

Team Felix's specific task was to organize resistance in the east part of Cotes du Nord on the basis of groups of 100 men. Also the team would investigate possible landing grounds in the area both for Lysander and Dakota operations. The possibility of sea operations for supplying the area was also to be studied.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Frederick.

Equipment

Standard "A" load and standard Jedburgh packages.

Scale of Air Support Likely

To establish increasing numbers of resistance groups in the Brittany area the command was planning 620 sorties, totalling 780 tons of stores, during the month of July. However, the team was still advised to be careful about the numbers they organized. One group was to be established and armed before a new one was attempted.

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Operations. Team Felix (Cont'd)Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

FFI When Guerrilla activities began, Colonel Eono (817) would arrive to take command as chief of the FFI in Brittany. Until the arrival of this French officer, the team would be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, (818) FFI chief in this area.

Other Jedburgh Parties. The team was being dropped to a reception party organized by team Frederick.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. In case the team was overrun by Allied forces they had instructions to report to the nearest unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give none of the details of their work to this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to start organizing resistance groups immediately upon its arrival. The total number of effectives to be armed was about 1,600. The specific groups to be armed was to be decided jointly with the FFI. Caution was to be taken against organizing larger groups than could be armed.

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If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner they were in the position of a combat soldier in uniform. All the laws of war should apply to them. Therefore, each member of the team would give his name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its being dispatched:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of enemy dumps and depots.
3. Sitrep on Jedburgh team Frederick, the team arranging for their reception.

First Word from Field

On 10 July Felix reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message (819):

"Have arrived safely with all containers and money for Fred. Spare receiver smashed. Have contacted local partisan chief."

Summary of Messages Exchanged10 July From Felix (820)

"Require maps 1/50,000 St Malo, Dinan, St Meen, Mur du Bretagne. Also complete receiver. Paratroop unit moving on foot east from Lanballe east Planguenoual."

11 July From Felix (821)

"Have not yet managed to contact Bourgoin, believed in Finistere. Hope to meet Fred Friday Legoursax. Making recce. Dinan, Plancouet, Lamballe. Partisan leader reports number resistance underground Arez area approximately 7,000."

11 July From Felix (822)

"Require arms load A for 500 night 17/18."

12 July From Felix (823)

"Have contacted local leader of Dinan and Plancouet. Dinan 1,000 unarmed, being organized. Plancouet 500 organized armed. Require 500,000 francs for each. Population very friendly."

(819) No code number 10 Jul 44
(821) C-4923/2 11 Jul 44
(823) C-4964/8 12 Jul 44

(820) C-4889/6 10 Jul 44
(822) C-4927/14 11 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)13 July From Felix (824)

"Bridge at Lancieux prepared for demolition. Can prevent demolition of bridge, Plancoet. Required 2 aspirants as instructors and saboteurs."

14 July From Felix (825)

"Require 2,000,000 francs Maquis Le Chat. Also three Eureka's. Suggest cash be dropped on Aspirand."

15 July From Felix (826)

"SAS dropping Jugons area. Stores cannot be received on ground Ancelot. 200 or 300 German troops in Chateau Ranlion, 3 kms S W Jugon."

19 July From Felix (827)

"Frederick attacked 4 or 5 days ago has lost all except arms, crystals, ciphers. Wants radio from me. Send radio complete ground Mossi."

20 July From Felix (828)

"Visited maquis Bois de Bougere, 96 kms SW Broons. Numbers 120 armed, 30 nucleus arms and Viviane. Three Americans there, names Diggers, King, Carestia. Crew Liberator bailed out St Meen 8 June. Also seen 1 Russian captain and 10 deserters with arms in maquis."

23 July From Felix (829)

"Frederick's radio smashed. Chute failed. Have sent on your messages. Will take 4 days to reach Fred."

28 July From Felix (830)

"Have contacted Francois. Urgent need for Jedburgh team for region between Frederick and us. Send him on ground Foulah with 2,000,000 francs. Necessary for men already in maquis."

29 July From Felix (831)

"American lightning pilot buried Ploubalay 24 July. Named Swarl Wurst."

30 July From Felix (832)

"Received notes on sea operation. Have sent on to Marceau and Fred. Money handed to FFI local chief. Thanks for mail etc. Send map sheets Dinan. Lost them."

(824) C-1/41 13 Jul 44
 (826) C-71/42 15 Jul 44
 (828) C-242/79 20 Jul 44
 (830) C-573/28 28 Jul 44
 (832) C-675/40 30 Jul 44

(825) C-40/30 14 Jul 44
 (827) C-205/62 19 Jul 44
 (829) C-334/7 23 Jul 44
 (831) C-619/36 29 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)31 July From Felix (833)

"Have seen today Francis, Gavin and Guy. After difficulties certain groups of resistance have succeeded in contacting chiefs FFI."

1 August From Felix (834)

"Contacted 3 Americans and sent them to maquis Bougue Neuf. Names Lt Hendrikson, Mustang pilot; Lt Keeler, 505 Paratroops; Lt Foginder, Thunderbolt pilot."

1 August From Felix (835)

"Diola attacked just before reception. 6 Partisans 1 SAS killed. Cannot accept further drops Diola. Repeat Viviane instead."

1 August From Felix (836)

"Four civilian cars set on fire by Allied fighters last 2 weeks, including cars of an FFI chief and man who sheltered pilots."

1 August From SFHQ to Felix (837)

"In view allied advance your area now highest priority. Inform us all grounds you require served to complete armament. Avoid guerrilla actions until receipt further orders which follow soon."

1 August From Watermark to Yankeeoodle (838)

"Nearest organized area in Brittany is eastern Cotes du Nord where Jedburgh Felix is. He reports 4000 to 6000 men of whom half are armed dispersed in 5 battalions at Jugon, Dinan, Plancoet, Pleneuf, Colliner. His Hq is near Megrit 6 kms SSE Jugon. His zone action is the line Matignon, Jugon. He has armed the area east of line Pleneuf, Collinee. What instructions do you wish us send Felix and can you give any indication time when action might be required."

2 August From SFHQ to Felix (839)

"Allied advance now expected to be rapid in your direction. Greatest importance attached to preservation of road St Brieuc, Lamballe, Dinan. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc. on this road and also on secondary roads in this area. Report if you require assistance and your prospects of success in this task."

2 August From Felix (840)

"Details effectives - Jugon, armed 1150; Dinan armed

(833) C-718/37 31 Jul 44

(835) C-770/48 1 Aug 44

(837) C-6086 1 Aug 44

(839) C-4483 2 Aug 44

(834) C-771/47 1 Aug 44

(836) C-772/49 1 Aug 44

(838) C-DRO/148 1 Aug 44

(840) C-826/51 2 Aug 44

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150, non-armed 1800; Plancoet, armed 600, non-armed 900; Pleneuf, armed 750, non-armed 100; Collinee, armed 450, non-armed 200. Total armed 3100, non-armed 3000."

2 August From Felix (841)

"Can prevent demolitions on roads. Cannot prevent destruction important road bridge Dinan because Dinan area non-armed. Assistance for this task required. Bridge already mined. Strength enemy Dinan Approximately 300."

3 August From Felix (842)

"Operations night 2/3 August. Attacked two large convoys leaving Dinan. Have 45 prisoners. Our losses 9, one wounded."

4 August From Felix (843)

"Two large convoys attacked region Plancoet. 10 prisoners taken. Withdrew following attack against Germans. Our losses 10. Germans retiring toward the west."

4 August From Tapdance to Underfoot (844)

"Have contacted Felix. Felix protecting road Dinan Jugon - Lamballe. Resistance protecting road Lamballe St Brieuc - Guingamp. Resistance will protect road Guingamp - Morlaix."

5 August From Felix (845)

"Can occupy Dinan. Urgently require dropping."

6 August From Felix (846)

"Jugon occupied by resistance since last night. All roads to town blocked."

7 August From SFHQ to Felix (847)

"Confirm the arrival Etat Major Brittany and Colonel Eono night 4/5 on Frederick. Name of Eono mission is Aloes. Dispatched the same night a Jed team named Daniel to act as liaison with FFI Cotes du Nord."

7 August From Felix (848)

"Contacted Major Bartlett, 3rd US Army at Jugon today at 1130 hours."

7 August From Felix (849)

"Urgently need money for maquis. Send 2 million on Sara. Require arms for Dinan."

(841) C-850/56 2 Aug 44

(843) C-987/57 4 Aug 44

(845) C-1037/59 5 Aug 44

(847) C-457 7 Aug 44

(849) C-1197/66 7 Aug 44

(842) C-922/54 3 Aug 44

(844) C-127/53 4 Aug 44

(846) C-1105/60 6 Aug 44

(848) C-1184/64 7 Aug 44

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"Contacted task force attacking Dinard. Have given all available information on defenses. FFI forces guarding road Dinan-Jugon-Lamballe-St Brieuc. Harassing remaining Germans on coastal sector."

12 August From Felix (851)

"Have visited 50 wounded our hospital Broans. Urgently need medical supplies."

12 August From SFHQ to Felix (852)

"Regret cannot send air operations just now. You should contact advance elements 3rd Army your region and ask them to assist you with necessary medical equipment. Is quickest method of obtaining it. Tell us urgently if you have any difficulties."

14 August From Felix (853)

"400 Germans left in the Gap Frehel. Refuse to surrender. Now have 1000 FFI to prevent them leaving and obtaining food. We are shelling them with captured artillery. Have contacted 8 Corps who will assist when possible."

15 August From Felix (854)

"Strong American forces arrived yesterday evening. After shelling this morning German garrison surrendered to FFI. Casualties 2 wounded."

17 August From Felix (855)

"Contacted 8th Corps, 3rd American Army. Will not supply medical equipment requested in name of Felix for FFI."

18 August From Felix (856)

"Operations Jugon since 2 August. Attacked and captured convoy. 226 prisoners. Captured 15 cars, 26 trucks, 45 horses, 1 cannon, 150 guns, 1 ton ammunition, 10 tons miscellaneous. Our losses 8 killed, 10 wounded."

18 August From Felix (857)

"Operations Pleneuf since 2 August. Germans convoys attacked. 24 prisoners, 8 cannons, 80 tons munitions captured. Our losses 7 wounded."

19 August From SFHQ to Felix (858)

"Congratulations of General Koenig to the groups of

(850) C-1318/69	9 Aug 44	(851) C-1635/65	12 Aug 44
(852) C-2606	12 Aug 44	(853) C-1666/68	14 Aug 44
(854) C-1741/72	15 Aug 44	(855) C-1919/76	17 Aug 44
(856) C-2001/80	18 Aug 44	(857) C-2017/83	18 Aug 44
(858) C-1812	19 Aug 44		

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Jugon and Pleneuf. Contact Aloes who will return you to us. Heartiest congratulations for magnificent work."

20 August From Felix (859)

"Operations Dinan since 2 August. Captured radio, depots, munitions at St Meen. 59 Germans killed, 356 prisoners. 4 cars destroyed, 24 captured. Our losses 15, 7 wounded."

20 August From Felix (860)

"Job finished. Cannot contact Aloes. If no contrary order we leave next Tuesday with Aguires."

20 August From SFHQ to Felix (861)

"General Koenig's congratulations messages directed at the group at Dinan too. We understand that you will return Tuesday if there is no other order. We agree with this and are warning Aloes."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 8 July to 23 August 1944

Mission. Team Felix was alerted on 7 July and briefed in London on 8 July. Their mission was to organize and arm resistance in the eastern half of the Cotes du Nord, to find landing grounds, and if possible a suitable place on the coast for the landing of stores for the resistance. Contact was to be made with Frederick and Commandant Bourgoin (SAS).

Dropping. The team was dropped to a reception committee 3 kilometers northeast of Jugon on 9 July at 0045 hours. Five aircraft containing arms were also received by this reception committee which was laid on by Frederick, though he had not seen the ground.

Order of jumping: Captain Kernevel, Captain Marchant, Sergeant Colvin.

There were no casualties on landing. We found the reception committee well organized and efficient, especially in view of the fact that a main road ran along one side of the ground 300 meters away and a battalion of Germans were resting

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for the night 1 kilometer away.

We consider that the stick of which we were a part was too large (12 containers, 3 men, 5 packages, 2 bicycles). This caused a delay of 2½ hours before our packages were located.

First Contacts. We contacted on the dropping ground Francois (Civilian FFI Chief Cotes du Nord), Yves (Civilian FFI Chief Cotes du Nord East) and Jean (Military Chief Cotes du Nord East). They appeared to be unaware that a team was dropping to them.

We were conducted to a house 1½ kilometers away while the reception committee collected the containers etc with carts.

At 0900 hours 9 July we met for the initial conference, Francois, Yves, Jean and Hector (862) (Resistance leader from Plancoet). After telling them of our mission, they gave us the picture of Resistance in the area and we discovered that there was no unified FFI but that different organizations (FN, FTP, Liberation, AS, ORAF) were working separately. Nevertheless FN and FTP (both chiefly left organizations) formed 80% of the resistance. Therefore, we decided to visit each sector of our area and to contact the chiefs of the different elements of resistance. We had the full agreement of Francois, Yves, and Jean that no point of view other than purely military was to be considered.

Nobody had heard of Commandant Bourgoïn (SAS) and we were unable to make contact with him. The only SAS known in the region was a Lieutenant Fouquet whom we tried repeatedly to contact, and who never contacted us, and who during the

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whole of our work hindered us considerably by issuing orders clashing with ours.

Method used for Movement. From the start we made it a rule never to stay in one spot for longer than 48 hours. We carried with us the radio and the minimum personal equipment (quite heavy enough).

Equipment carried:-

Carbine, Pistol belt with compass magazines

Rucksack containing part of radio

Sleeping bag

Washing kit

Socks, shirt

Note: We each bought a good map case before we left which we found invaluable.

All the remaining equipment was hidden near Jugon. For each stage we only had with us the local leader whose area we were crossing and one guide who knew the area well and who went ahead when crossing main roads, railways, etc, and when we approached villages, a method which proved very satisfactory. The local leaders were well known in their areas and were able to introduce us to leading members of the resistance, mayors, cures, gendarmes, etc. We always moved by day in uniform, spending the nights at farms. We were unable to avoid contact with farmers and peasants while en route but our meetings had a considerable effect on morale. We had no trouble obtaining food and shelter for which we always paid.

First tour of the Area.

10 July Left Jugon for Trelivan
Contacted Herve (Chef Civile FFI for Dinan).
Selected dropping ground SARA.

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- 11 July Trelivan - Boursuel.
Contacted Hector. Selected Dropping ground Bambara.
- 12 July Boursuel - Tregomar
Contacted Alexander (French Intelligence Agent).
Selected Dropping ground Mossi and agreed Mildred.
- 13 July Tregomar - Seignac
Contacted Squadron Leader Smith (SAS) and Le Chat (Liberation Leader) and tried to get understanding between Jean and Le Chat.
- 14 July Seignac
Contact with resistance members from Collinee.
- 15 July Seignac - Dolo
Contact with resistance members from Lamballe.
- 16 July Dolo - Jugon
- 17 - 18 July Jugon First dropping Sara night 18/19 July.

The first tour gave us an idea of the numbers to be armed, numbers of dropping grounds, and ideas for military action when required.

Second tour of the Area.

- 19 - 20 July Jugon - Dolo.
- 20 July Dolo - Seignac
Inspected Maquis in Bois de Bougeneuf.
Contacted resistance leader of Collinee.
Organized the Broons area and agreed the dropping ground Viviane.
- 21 July Seignac - Plumaudan
- 22 July Plumaudan
Visited Maquis at Bois d'yvignac. Contacted various leaders. Agreed dropping ground Toucouleur. Contacted Herve (Chef Dinan) and organized Dinan area.
- 23 July Plumaudan - Languenan
Contacted leaders of various groups.
Organized area north of Dinan.
- 24 July Languenan
Selected dropping ground Lobi (2)
- 25 July Languenan - St Potan
Recontacted Alexander. Contacted Henri (Civilian Chief FFI Pleneuf) and Andre (Military Chief FFI Pleneuf Sector)

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- 26 July St Potan - Henanbien
- 27 July Henanbien - La Poterie
Contacted Marcel (Leader Lamballe) and
arranged for liaison with Pleneuf sector.
- 28 - 29 July La Poterie - St Igneuc - Jugon
Contacted Francois with message from
Marceau, Military Chief FFI, Cotes du Nord.
- 30 July - 1 August Jugon
Contacted by Guy (863) and Gavin (864),
and agreed to include Dinard in our
area.

Organization and Armement on 2 August 1944Training and Liaison

1. Organization.

The area was organized by us into five sectors of
battellions.

- a. Jugon (Pletan - Plelan - Yvignac - Broons)
- b. Dinan (Dinan - Caulnes - Evran)
- c. Plancoet (Dinard - Ploubelay - Langnenan - Boiseul -
Matignon)
- d. Pleneuf (Sable d'Or - Henanbien - Lamballe)
- e. Collinee (Moncontom - Collinee - Merdrignac)

Each sector contained a variable number of coys composed
as follows:

Coy Headquarters, 3Pls of 25 men each, one sabotage section
of 15 men.

Except for the two Maquis, of which we have already spoken
and which existed before our arrival, all the coys were local
and remained dispersed in their homes.

2. Numbers and Armament.

Before our arrival the numbers of resistance armed was
approximately 300.

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<u>Sector</u>	<u>Numbers FFI</u>	<u>Numbers Armed</u>
Jugon	1200	1150
Dinan	2000	150
Plancoet	1500	600
Pleneuf	900	750
Collinee	600	450
	<u>6200</u>	<u>3100</u>

The five dropping grounds by which Dinan could have been armed Bambara, Lobi (Two), Toucouleur (Two) were successively refused by the RAF on account of flak, although we signalled that there was no flak for at least 10 kilometers round these grounds. This accounts for the small numbers armed in the Dinan sector.

We received altogether 46 aircraft in 15 days, 21 others which were laid on for the first week in August were too late due to the rapid advance of the American forces.

3. Liaison. Our Headquarters was formed near Jugon and liaison was maintained with sectors principally by girls on bicycles, owing to the difficulty for men to pass the checks frequently made by the Feldgendarmarie.

4. Training and Morale. The morale was excellent as was shown by the results achieved. These would, however, have been a great deal better had we had instructors for each company or at least each sector to instruct in the use of the various arms received. It was impossible for us, a single team, to give more than a smattering to very few. We asked several times for Aspirants whom Colonel Eono had told us were available. Probably half the killed in our area lost their lives due to faulty handling of weapons, particularly the filling of Bren magazines.

There seemed to be a lack of trained officer material in

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the resistance forces. As an example, M Tassel, leader of Jugon Coy, was killed in an ambush and it was necessary to spend a complete day collecting the coy together again.

Operations after 2 August 1944. While touring the area we found that it would be possible to attack all the small German posts in the inland districts (Dumps S/L etc). The coast, heavily fortified and held, was to be blocked and cut off from movement inland. The fortifications at Pleurtuit (Dinard), which the Germans had been preparing for more than a year against attack from inland, were to be merely watched, as it had been unable to arm Dinan and Dinard. All the communications were to be cut and permanent ambushes placed along roads to harass convoys and destroy any small groups.

This programme was put into effect on the evening of 2 August 1944 when the BBC message "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il encore a Perros-Guirec" was received. We then had 30 coys composing of 3100 armed men.

The following is a brief summary of operations.

Jugon Four attacks on important convoys, numerous ambushes, Jugon occupied, destruction of observation post at Megrit destroyed.

Dinan Capture of radio station at Caulnes intact. Capture of food dump (8000 tons) at St Meen. Capture of ammunition dump at Le Hingle.

Plancoet Capture of coast defences at St Cast. Derailment and attack of ammunition train. Numerous attacks on convoys, and the pushing of the Germans back to Cap Frenel.

Pleneuf Capture of coast defences between Valandre and Ercouay and the pushing of the remaining German forces back to

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Cap Frehel where they withdrew behind mined defences.

Collinee Attack on a column of 600 - 700 parachutists which were halted for 6 hours in front of Merdrignac where 6 hostages were shot in retaliation. The same column was attacked at Moncontour where 13 hostages were shot.

The Germans still remaining were hunted down and all our forces were put to protecting communications following a request from the 3rd American Army.

12 coys were moved to Cap Frehel to prevent the Germans there (400) from obtaining food in the local farms and village of Plevenon. We were able to shell Cap Frehel with two captured 76 mm guns (FOO Captain Kernevel) and we learned later that one German was killed and six wounded by our fire. We had already contacted 8th Corps and asked for assistance which arrived the next day, and after heavy bombardment the garrison surrendered.

The results obtained were amazing considering the lack of instruction and training as armed bodies, and lack of necessary clothing etc. Too few socks and boots were sent to us, and the large proportion of the boots were of too large a size. One cannot ask men to fight in wooden clogs.

Our German prisoners were held by us under control of FFI. All engineers and personnel trained in lifting mines are at present clearing the coast and Cap Frehel of mines of which "S" mines are predominant.

Liaison with American Forces. Complete coordination was established between us and the advanced American forces. On 6 August we were contacted by Major Bartlett (865) liaison officer between 3rd Army Headquarters and FFI.

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The French liaison officers with advanced American units seemed to be almost totally ignorant of the existence of the FFI, its organization and its role. In fact we met one Civil Affairs Captain at Dinan who did not know the name of General Koenig or what the initials FFI stood for. However, we found him very cooperative.

The American forces were very complimentary on the work of FFI in the area, who, they said, had taken the place of their infantry during the advance.

SAS There were no large SAS forces in our area, only single officers and NCO's working alone. We have already spoken of Lieutenant Fouquet. We contacted at Sevignac Squadron Leader Smith, who appeared to be doing exactly the same work as a Jedburgh, but with orders very different from those which we received. He advocated the forming of Maquis and had given orders to the groups of resistance which he controlled to take to the Maquis. This had already taken place in some areas and there were considerable Maquis unarmed.

It had already been proved that Brittany as a whole and Cotes du Nord in particular were not suitable areas for Maquis, by reason of the ease with which the whole area could be controlled by mobile troops. A few days after our arrival the Maquis in the forest of Boquin was surprised by a German battalion and was only able to escape with losses and the abandonment of the greater part of their stores. The same thing occurred a few weeks later in the Maquis of the forest of Hardouinais. As a result of these events, the small Maquis in our area were disbanded and sent home by their chiefs who agreed to our theory of local companies staying at home till required and having their weapons hidden near

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their dwellings. Only in two cases were the conditions in the countryside favorable for Macuis. These we have already mentioned - Bougeneuf (120) and Bois d'Yvignac (20).

In our briefing we were instructed that resistance activity was to be of a minimum while the arming of the area was in progress. However, sabotage by the SAS continued to be carried out in the area south of Dinan and the area of Legouray, causing increased surveillance and repressive measures during this difficult period which forced resistance leaders, "refracteurs", repeatedly to move.

It is impossible to have two different organizations both arming resistance in the same area. The arming and preparation for combat is of vital importance and it is essential that a unit whose job is that of sabotage and guerrilla activity should rest under the orders of a Jedburgh team whose job is armament and organization.

Most of the small bodies of SAS did not have wireless communication and continued to work according to obsolete orders refusing to listen to more recent ones from London.

Radio. Communications were good, and a very high standard was maintained.

With two schedules per day, we thought it necessary not to transmit more than twice from one spot, and this theory proved correct, as at Dolo on 20 July the very field which we had been operating in was searched half an hour after we had left. We had given instructions that all slow moving vehicles were to be carefully watched.

It is suggested that Broadcasts sent by hand should be kept at the same speed as those put out on the tape, as

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interference causes split letters.

We found that the set could be set up and working within 5 minutes and dismantled in the same time.

Messages written in French were easier to decipher than those in English due to the French language having more conformity than English, even when deciphered by the English member of the team.

84 Messages were sent ---- total of 3285 groups.

Approximately 50 messages received -- total of 2375 groups.

Notes on Briefing. We found the briefing extremely quick and as we were told two days before we went to London to be briefed that we were going to the Cotes du Nord, we feel that we could have got in one more day's briefing in London.

More information about the different resistance organizations (FN, FTP, AS Liberation, etc) should have been given since it was extremely easy to be tactless due to lack of knowledge when in the field.

It should not have been necessary to have had to ask the navigator of the aircraft 15 minutes before take-off time where we were dropping; surely this information could have been made available at the briefing.

Maps of the area in which we were to work were not available except for Michelin, and were not received till we had been in the field for 3 weeks although demanded in our second message (10 July).

Notes on the Political Situation and Resistance Parties

We never departed from our attitude of strict neutrality concerning political matters, although our opinions were asked for several times. We also refrained from giving any opinions

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on civilian affairs, especially on the question of collaboration. In any case it was impossible to have the same outlook as those who had lived under German rule for four years, and who had witnessed occurrences of collaborations since 1940, of which we heard numerous stories.

Nevertheless we learned a great deal about the political and civilian reorganization. It was plain that the greater part of the resistance was formed by parties of the Left. The FTP seemed to be essentially Communist. The FN, the largest resistance party in the Cotes du Nord, was of communist origin, but its scope had widened considerably, embracing members whose political views were Right, members of the Regular Army who declined to consider political questions, and priests, etc. The parties AS and Liberation were essentially Right, but their numbers were rather small. In the Cotes du Nord the FN was the movement which most desired common union as FFI. The FTP, however, wished to preserve their individuality. For example on 21 August we received an order from a Colonel Courtois, Chef FTP Cotes du Nord, whom we had never heard of or been told about before. His orders ran parallel with those given by Lieutenant-Colonel Marceau, sole Chief FFI recognized by Frederick and us in the Department.

We were given a sure lead on the political feeling by the fact that all the dinners at which we were invited to preside during our last week, were invariably finished with "God Save the King", "The Marseillaise", and the "Internationale".

The leaders both civil and military sent by the Provisional Government were not in all cases accepted, and some of them should probably be removed from office. We give as examples Colonel Glohen, Commandant of the St Brieuf Sub Division,

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who was handicapped by lack of prestige, and the Mayor of Dinan.

In conclusion, however, we are able to say that the greatest wish of a Frenchman is to eliminate graft in political and municipal affairs, an impression which we gained during our stay of 7 weeks in France.

General. When requests are made from the field it is appreciated if in lieu of the stores, a telegram could be sent explaining the reason for their non-arrival, e.g. Aspirants and money.

When we left, we were expressly told that our relatives would be informed after three weeks that we were overseas and would subsequently be informed at intervals that we were still alive and well. In the cases of Captain Marchant and Sergeant Colvin no such messages were sent at all, leaving their relatives without news for 7 weeks. This we consider to be a gross breach of the agreement made and we trust that future Jedburgh teams will not be so treated.

Conclusion. In conclusion we should like to say that we found the mission extremely interesting and our sole regret is that we could not have been sent earlier into this area, where the possibilities were so great.

Financial Statement

Received -----	250,000 Francs
	150 Dollars
 Expenses	
Food -----	15,000
Lodging -----	5,000
Hotel (Jugon) -----	4,000
Car repairs -----	5,570
Petrol -----	1,200
Assistance to American pilots	
joining maquis -----	5,000
Senegalese and Russians freed by us @--	2,500
Miscellaneous -----	4,150
Total -----	42,420
Returned -----	207,580